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I. FRAGMENTATION OF GLOBAL LAW: TWO REDUCTIONISMS

Predictions of future events tend to be a rarity within the social sciences. It is an even more rare occurrence when predicted events come to
pass. Niklas Luhmann's prediction on the future of global law is a
*
PhD, Frankfurt University (2003); LL.M., EUI, Florence (2003); Assistant at the
Institute of Economic Law, J. W. Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main, and Member of the research group "International Organization, Democratic Peace and the Rule of Law" Peace
Research Institute Frankfurt.
**
Professor of Private Law and Legal Sociology, Frankfurt/Main University, and
Centennial Visiting Professor, London School of Economics.
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memorable exception. In 1971, while theorizing on the concept of world
society, Luhmann allowed himself the "speculative hypothesis" that global
law would experience a radical fragmentation, not along territorial, but
along social sectoral lines. The reason for this would be a transformation
from normative (politics, morality, law) to cognitive expectations (economy, science, technology); a transformation that would be effected during
the transition from nationally organized societies to a global society.
At the level of global society, this means that norms (in the form
of values, stipulations, goals) will no longer pre-programme recognition patterns; rather, and in stark contrast, the problem of
learning adaptation will gain structural primacy, so that the
structural conditions for learning within each social system must
be supported through normatisation.'
Subsequent analyses added a complementary prediction: should the
law of a global society become entangled within sectoral interdependences, a wholly new form of conflicts law will emerge; an 'intersystemic conflicts law,' derived not from collisions between the distinct
nations of private international law, but from collisions between distinct global social sectors.
And indeed, a quarter of a century later, an almost explosive expansion of independent and globally active, yet sectorally limited,
courts, quasi-courts and other forms of conflict-resolving bodies did
occur.3 The project on "International Courts and Tribunals" '4 has identified the astonishing figure of around 125 international institutions, in
which independent authorities reach final legal decisions. Amongst
others, this international jurisdiction comprises the International Court
of Justice (ICJ), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
1.

Niklas

Luhmann,

Die

Weltgesellschaft, 57

ARCHIV

FOR

RECHTS

UND

SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 21 (1971), reprintedin SOZIOLOGISCHE AUFKLXRUNG VOL. 2: AUFSXTZE

51, 63 (Niklas Luhmann ed., 3d ed. 1986) (our translation).
2.
GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 100 (Anne Bankowska &
Ruth Adler trans., Zenon Bankowski ed., Blackwell 1993).
3.
Georges Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks, 31
N.Y.U. J.INT'L L. & POL. 919, 923 (1999); for proposals of categorisation, see Thomas Buergenthal, Proliferationof InternationalCourts and Tribunals: Is it Good or Bad?, 14 LEIDEN J.
INT'L L. 267 (2001); for documentation of collisions, see Karin Oellers-Frahm, Multiplication
of International Courts and Tribunals and Conflicting Jurisdiction-Problemsand Possible
Solutions, 5 MAX PLANCK U.N.Y.B. 67 (2001); Roger P. Alford, FederalCourts, International
Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 675 (2003).
4.
The "Project on International Courts and Tribunals" [hereinafter PICT] was
founded in 1997 by the Center on International Cooperation [hereinafter CIC], New York
University, and the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development [hereinafter FIELD]. From 2002 onwards, PICT has been a common project of the CIC and of the
Center for International Courts and Tribunals, University College London. See PICT, at
http://www.pict-pcti.org (last visited May 14, 2004).
ZUR THEORIE DER GESELLSCHAFT
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various tribunals for reparations, international criminal courts and tribunals, hybrid international-national tribunal instances, trade and
investment judicial bodies, regional human rights tribunals and convention-derived institutions, as well as other regional courts, such as the
European Court of Justice, the EFTA Court, and the Benelux Court.5
Most recently, the inauguration of the WTO Appellate Body, the ICTY,
the ICTR and the ICC unveiled this long-standing trend and immediately provoked a lively discussion on the risks posed by a proliferation
of international courts and the fragmentation of international law. The
issue of how to combat what traditional international lawyers view as a
44
"pathological"
relativit normative,6 as well as all the problems of contradictions between individual decisions, rule collisions, doctrinal
inconsistency and conflict between different legal principles is increasingly concerning case law,7 expert committees,8 ICJ presidents9 and
5.
PICT, supra note 4, has gathered good documentation on legal frameworks and
explicatory literature. For Dinah Shelton's instructive presentation on the area of human
rights, see DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 137-182
(Oxford U. Press 1999). See also CARSTEN LUTZ, KOMPETENZKONFLIKTE UND
AUFGABENVERTEILUNG ZWISCHEN NATIONALEN UND INTERNATIONALEN GERICHTEN: ERSTE

BAUSTEINE EINER WELTGERICHTSORDNUNG 19 (2003); regarding "Hybrid Courts," see Laura
Dickinson, The Promiseof Hybrid Courts, 97 Am.J. INT'L L. 295 (2003).
6.
Along these lines is the early critique made by Prosper Weil. See Prosper Weil,
Towards Relative Normativity in InternationalLaw?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 440 (1983); for
the original French text, see Prosper Weil, Vers une normativiti relative en droit international?, 86 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 5 (1982).
7.
On the question of State responsibility loci classici, see, e.g., Prosecuter v. Tadic,
Judgements Int'l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
Int'l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Case
No. IT-94-l-A, at paras. 115-145 (July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Tadic]; Military
and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 62, paras. 109-116 (June 27)
[hereinafter Nicar. V. U.S.].
8.
See Report of the Study Group on Fragmentationof InternationalLaw: Difficulties
Arisingfrom the Diversificationand Expansion of InternationalLaw, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, at 237, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.628 (2002) [hereinafter Report on Fragmentation];
see also ILC Reports, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. No. A/Cn.4/L.644 (2003); Study on the Function and Scope of the lex specialis Rule and the Question of "Self-Contained Regimes,"
Preliminary Report by Martti Koskenniemi, Chairman of the Study Group of the ILC, at
ILC(LVI)/SG/FIIJCRD.l (May 4, 2004) [hereinafter Koskenniemi Preliminary Report]; see
further Martti Koskenniemi, Outline of the Chairman of the ILC Study Group on Fragmentation
of International law: The Function and Scope of the lex specialis Rule and the Question of
"Self-Contained Regimes," at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/sessions/55/fragmentation-outline.pdf,
at 2-10 (2003) [hereinafter Koskenniemi Outline].
9.
Report of Stephen M. Schwebel, President of the International Court of Justice,
U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 13, at 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.39 (1999) [hereinafter
Schwebel]; see also Report of Gilbert Guillaume, Presidentof the InternationalCourt of Justice, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 13, at 7, U.N. Doc. A/55/PV.42 (2000) [hereinafter
Guillaume Report], which warns of an 'unwanted confusion' and a 'risk of conflicting judgments', and accordingly supports Schwebel's suggestion that the ICJ should be given the
jurisdiction to provide advisory opinions at the request of international tribunals. See also
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academic controversies.'0 The open question remaining is whether traditional, nation-state informed modes of tackling collisions of law will
suffice, or whether a radical rethinking of conflicts law is necessary.
A characteristic legal reductionism, however, may also be observed
here; a reductionism which both oversimplifies the manner in which
norm conflicts are understood, and which narrows the possible range of
their solution. In principle, lawyers register only a confusing variety of
autonomous legal fields, self-contained regimes and highly specialized
tribunals. By this token, they identify a danger to the unity of international law because the conceptual-doctrinal consistency, the clear
hierarchy of norms and the effective judicial hierarchy that was developed within the nation-states, is lacking." Accordingly, they direct
themselves to a hierarchical solution to the problem, which, whilst not
wholly reproducing the ideal of legal hierarchies of the nation-state, at
least comes somewhere close to it. One far-reaching suggestion argues
that as soon as a new tribunal is established, the ICJ should be given jurisdiction as an appeals instance. Alternatively the ICJ, whose
"advisory opinions" would preserve the unity of international law,
should be invoked in the case of conflicts between jurisdictions. 3 One
even more far-reaching suggestion not only entails the establishment of
an international convention under the auspices of Article 17 of the ILC
Statute Procedure,' 4 but also promotes a certification procedure:

Gilbert Guillaume, The Future of InternationalJudicial Institutions, 44 INT'L & COMp. L.Q.
848, 861-862 (1995).
10.
See Jonathan Charney, The Impact on the InternationalLegal System of the Growth
of InternationalCourts and Tribunals,31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 697 (1999); Pierre-Marie
Dupuy, The Danger of Fragmentationor Unification of the InternationalLegal System and the
InternationalCourt of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 791 (1999); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and InternationalAdjudication: How to Constitutionalizethe U.N.
Dispute Settlement System?, 31 N.YU.J. INT'L L. & POL. 753 (1999); Cesare P.R Romano,
The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 709 (1999); Tullio Treves, Conflicts between the International Tribunalfor
the Law of the Sea and the InternationalCourt of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. I 809
(1999); see also Jonathan I. Charney, Is InternationalLaw Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?, 1998 HAGUE RECUEIL DES COURS 101; Martti Koskenniemi and Piivi
Leino, Fragmentationof InternationalLaw? PostmodernAnxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 553
(2002); Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Consistency in Holdings by International Tribunals, in
LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 633 (Nisuke Ando et al. eds., 2002); Abi-Saab, supra
note 3.
11.
See Study by Gerhard Hafner Risks Ensuing from Fragmentationof International
Law, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. Nr. 10, at 326, U.N. Doc. A/55/10 (2002) (Hafner's study
provided the impetus for the creation of the ILC Study Group).
12.
Oellers-Frahm, supra note 3, at 67.
13.
Schwebel, supra note 9, at 4; Guillaume Report, supra note 9; Hafner, supra note
11, at 335; Dupuy, supra note 10, at 801.
14.
Hafner, supra note 11, at 335-39.

Summer 20041

Regime-Collisions

1003

The ILC could be asked to devise a general 'check-list' to assist
States in preventing conflicts of norms, negative effects for individuals and overlapping competences with regard to existing
subsystems that could be affected by the new regime. In the
course of reviewing on-going negotiations, the LLC could even
issue 'no-hazard'-certificates indicating that the creation of a
specific new subsystem has no negative effects on existing regimes. 5
Quite apart from the fact that such hierarchical schemes have a
minimal chance of success, views oriented toward the logics of politics6
readily reveal that the problem of norm collision is under-evaluated.'
They locate the cause for fragmentation not within the lack of jurisdictional hierarchy, but see norm collisions educing from the underlying
conflicts between the "policies" pursued by different international organizations and regulatory regimes. In this political perspective,
collisions between legal norms are merely a mirror of the strategies followed by new collective actors within international relations, who pursue
power-driven "special interests" without reference to a common interest
and give rise to drastic "policy conflicts." Neither doctrinal formulas of
legal unity, nor the theoretical ideal of a norm hierarchy, nor the institutionalization of jurisdictional hierarchy provide an adequate means to
avoid such conflicts. Instead, the only possible perspective for dealing
with such policy conflicts is the explicit politicization of legal norm collisions through power mechanisms, negotiations between relevant
collective actors, public debate and collective decisions.
This observation is certainly correct. Its dramatic nature should
likewise not be underestimated. 7 Yet, even this political foundation
for legal norm collision is not deep enough and is in its turn a political
reductionism. Both legal and political approaches offer only a onedimensional explanation for collisions and, as a consequence, seek
15.
Id. at 399.
16.
Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 10.
17.
Martti Koskenniemi makes a subtle attempt to lessen post-modern anxieties,
Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 10, and has meanwhile taken the opportunity during his
leadership of the ILC Study Group to change its self-description from, "Risks ensuing from
fragmentation of international law" to the more soothing formula, "Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law,"
U.N. GAOR ILC, 55th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.644 (2003). This view, however, underestimates the problematic issue of consistency, resulting from the fragmentation
phenomenon for legitimacy, efficiency and credibility of law; similar are the deficiencies of
postmodern theories, even if they describe the legal fragmentation in its social context. See,
e.g., Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law, 14 J.L. Soc'y 279 (1987); Peter Fitzpatrick, Law and Societies, 22 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 115 (1984).
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similarly one-dimensional solutions either at the legal or the political
meta-level.' 8 Global legal pluralism, however, is not simply a result of
political pluralism, but is instead the expression of deep contradictions
between colliding sectors of a global society. At core, the fragmentation
of global law is not simply about legal norm collisions or policyconflicts, but rather has its origin in contradictions between society-wide
institutionalized rationalities, which law cannot solve, but which demand
a new legal approach to colliding norms. This thesis will be evolved with
three arguments:
1. The fragmentation of global law is more radical than any single reductionist perspective-legal, political, economic or
cultural-can comprehend. Legal fragmentation is merely an
ephemeral reflection of a more fundamental, multidimensional fragmentation of global society itself.
2.

Any aspirations to a normative unity of global law are thus
doomed from the outset. A meta-level at which conflicts
might be solved is wholly elusive both in global law and in
global society. Instead, we might expect intensified legal
fragmentation.

3. Legal fragmentation cannot itself be combated. At the best, a
weak normative compatibility of the fragments might be
achieved. However, this is dependent upon the ability of conflicts law to establish a specific network logic, which can
effect a loose coupling of colliding units.
II.

LEGAL COLLISIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOCIAL THEORY

Various social theories on legal globalization allow us to draw a
clearer picture of how legal fragmentation depends upon more fundamental processes of fragmentation within global society. The Stanford
School's institutionalist theory of "global culture," post-modem concepts
of global legal pluralism, discourse analysis of the global nature of law
and politics, various models of a "global civil society," and, in particular,
systemic concepts of a differentiated global society, have all propagated
an understanding of a polycentric form of globalization, which places
legal fragmentation in a different light.' 9 One arrives at such an under18.
Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalizationof Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 311, 371
(2002), makes a similar critique of legal and political (and economic) reductionism, but then
falls, for his part, into the trap of cultural reductionism.
19.
On global culture, see John W. Meyer et al., World Society and the Nation-State,
103 AM. J. Soc. 144 (1997). On discourse analysis, see Anton Schuitz, The Twilight of the
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standing, however, only if one gives up a series-six in total-of social
and legal theory conceptions and replaces them through somewhat unusual ideas. Much of this has been already dealt with elsewhere in detail,
so the following will focus only upon the outcomes, ° concentrating instead upon the particular consequences for the fragmentation of global
law.
A. Rationality Conflicts in a Polycentric Global Society
A first conception that must be dispensed with is the widespread assumption that global legal fragmentation is primarily a result of the
internationalization of the economy. The economic steering mechanisms
of the Nation-State have supposedly been unable to keep pace with the
creation of distinct global markets; instead, a variety of competing global
regulation regimes have been established, each with their own legal decisional instances." The alternative to such an economy-led form of

Global Polis: On Losing Paradigms, Environing Systems, and Observing World Society, in
GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE

257 (Gunther Teubner ed. 1997). On global legal pluralism,

see BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW, GLOB-

ALIZATION AND EMANCIPATION passim (2002); Boaventura De Sousa Santos, On Modes of
Productionof Law and Social Power, 13 INT'L J. Soc. L. 299 (1985). On global civil society,
see DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE To
COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE passim (1995); KLAUS GUNTHER & SHALINI RANDERIA,

28 (2001); Hauke
Brunkhorst, 1st die Solidaritatder Biirgergesellschaftglobalisierbar?,in GLOBALISIERUNG
UND DEMOKRATIE: WIRTSCHAFT, RECHT, MEDIEN 274 (Hauke Brunkhorst & Matthias Kettner
eds., 2000); Martin Shaw, Die Reprasentation ferner Konflikte und die globale
Zivilgesellschaft, in PERSPEKTIVEN DER WELTGESELLSCHAFT 221 (Ulrich Beck ed., 1998). On
global society, see MATHIAS ALBERT, ZUR POLITIK DER WELTGESELLSCHAFT: IDENTITAT UND
203 (2002); RUDOLF
RECHT IM KONTEXT INTERNATIONALER VERGESELLSCHAFTUNG
RECHT, KULTUR UND GESELLSCHAFT IM PROZESS DER GLOBALISIERUNG

STICHWEH, DIE WELTGESELLSCHAFT: SOZIOLOGISCHE

ANALYSEN passim (2000); HELMUT

13
(2003); Niklas Luhmann, Der Staat des politischen Systems: Geschichte und Stellung in der
Weltgesellschaft, in PERSPEKTIVEN DER WELTGESELLSCHAFT 345, 373 (Ulrich Beck ed., 1998).
See also the contributions in OBSERVING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: NIKLAS LUHMANN AND
WORLD POLITICS (Matthias Albert & Lena Hilkermeier eds., 2004).
Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in
20.
GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997); see also ANDREAS FISCHERWILLKE, HETEROTOPIA: STUDIEN ZUR KRISIS DER ORDNUNG MODERNER GESELLSCHAFTEN

LESCANO,

GLOBALVERFASSUNG:

DIE

GELTUNGSBEGRUNDUNG

DER MENSCHENRECHTE

IM

POSTMODERNEN lus GENTIUM (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at ch. 2, on file with authors);
Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Die Emergenz der Globalverfassung, 63 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 717 (2003); Gunther Teubner,
Altera Pars Audiatur: Law in the Collision of Discourses, in LAW, SOCIETY AND ECONOMY
149 (Richard Rawlings ed., 1997); Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism:Alternatives
to State-Centred ConstitutionalTheory?, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 3 (Christian Joerges & Inger-Johanne Sand & Gunther Teubner ed. 2004).
For Dahrendorf's argument, see Ralf Dahrendorf, Anmerkungen zur Globalisierung,
21.
in PERSPEKTIVEN DER WELTGESELLSCHAFT 41 (Ulrich Beck ed., Suhrkamp Verlag 1998).
AUSLANDISCHES
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globalization can, however, be termed "polycentric globalization. 22 The
primary motor for this development is an accelerated differentiation of
society into autonomous social systems, each of which springs territorial
confines and constitutes itself globally. This process is not confined to
markets alone but also encompasses science, culture, technology, health,
the military, transport, tourism and sport, as well as, albeit in a clearly
somewhat retarded form, politics, law and welfare; each of whose current developmental logic has today carved out an autonomous global
system.
Of interest in this current context is the external relations of these
global villages; the relationships they maintain with one another and the
more general relations with their environment. These are anything but
than harmonious. If anywhere, it is here that the notion of a "clash of
cultures" is appropriate. Through their own operative closure, global
functional systems create a sphere for themselves in which they are free
to intensify their own rationality without regard to other social systems
or, indeed, regard for their natural or human environment. They do this
for as long as they can; that is, for as long as it is tolerated by their environments.23 Ever since the pioneering analysis of Karl Marx, 4 repeated
proof has been furnished for the destructive potential of a globalized
economic rationality.25 Max Weber deployed the concept of modem
polytheism in his efforts to identify this potential within other areas of
life and to analyze the resulting, and threatening, rationality conflicts
which arise. 6 Today one speaks more frequently of discourse collisions.27
In the meantime, the human and ecological risks posed by other highly
specialized global systems, such as science and technology, have also
become readily apparent to a far broader public. Similarly, and especially where the position of countries within the Southern Hemisphere is
considered, it is clear that real dangers are posed less by the dynamics of
international politics and more by economic, scientific and technological
HELD, supra note 19, at 62. For further references to this topic, see generally all
22.
references, supra note 19.
NIKLAS LUHMANN, DIE GESELLSCHAFT DER GESELLSCHAFT 133 (1997).
23.
24 KARL MARX, DAS KAPITAL" KRITIK DER POLITISCHEN OKONOMIE (1883).
Most impressively by KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 3-5 (Farrer &
25.
Rinehart 1944).
26.
MAX WEBER, GESAMMELTE AUFSATZE ZUR WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE 586-97 (1951);
on Weber, see also WOLFGANG SCHLUCHTER, RELIGION UND LEBENSFOHRUNG 299-302
(1988).
27.
See generally JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE DIFFEREND: PHRASES IN DISPUTE
(1987).
28.
Literature which is influential in this area include: ULRICH BECK,
RISIKOGESELLSCHAFr: AUF DEM WEG IN EINE ANDERE MODERNE (1986); Ulrich Beck,
ANGEWANDTE
ZEITSCHRIFr
FOR
Umweltpolitik in der Risikogesellschaft, 4
UMWELTFORSCHUNG 117 (1991).
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rationality spheres that instigate the "clash of rationalities". According to
Niklas Luhmann's seminal thesis, the underlying cause for post-modem
risks is found within the rationality maximization engaged in by different globally active functional systems, which cloaks an enormous
potential for endangering people, nature and society. 9 Seen in this light,
the problems of global society, namely environmental degradation, spectacular social under-provision and stark discrepancies in life and
development potential, have an underlying cause that must be framed in
terms of functional differentiation and autonomous systems dynamics;
by the same token, it is simply inappropriate to explain the problems
raised by global finance markets, hedge funds, financial speculation,
pharmaceutical patents, the drug trade and reproductive cloning within a
political paradigm, and with a solving faith within the potential of political solutions. Such problems are caused by the fragmented and
operationally closed functional systems of a global society, which, in
their expansionist fervor, create the real problems of the global society,
and who at the same time make use of global law in order normatively
to secure their own highly refined sphere logics. ° It is dubious whether
the creation of judicial hierarchies can ever overcome a form of legal
fragmentation that derives from structural social contradictions. Reversal or a return to a coordinating form of international law,3' however,
and a resurrection of old myths is equally foreclosed: "[T]he sin of differentiation can never be undone. Paradise is lost."32
B. The Global Legal System and Inter-Legality
In order to better understand the connection between processes of
legal evolution and social differentiation, it is also necessary to give up
the idea that a legal system in its strict sense exists only at the level of
the Nation-State. Instead, one must proceed from the assumption that
law has also, and in line with the logic of functional differentiation, established itself globally as a unitary social system. However, the unity of
global law is no longer structure-based, as in the case of the NationState, within institutionally secured normative consistency; but is rather
process-based, deriving simply from the modes of connection between
legal operations, which transfer binding legality between even highly

29.
30.

supra note 23, at 1088-96.
Gunther Teubner, Altera ParsAudiatur: Law in the Collision of Discourses,in
LUHMANN,

SOCIETY AND ECONOMY 149 (Richard Rawlings ed., 1997).
31.
See, e.g., ERNST-WOLFGANG BOCKENFORDE, STAAT, NATION, EUROPA

Weil, supra note 6.
32.
NIKLAS LUHMANN,

DIE WIRTSCHAFT DER GESELLSCHAFT

344 (1994).

LAW,

123 (1999);
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heterogeneous legal orders.33 This is an indirect result of the globalization of societal differentiation. Unity of the legal system has been
achieved at global level, but it must also reckon with a multitude of internal contradictions. Legal unity within global law is redirected away
from normative consistency towards operative "inter-legality." 34 What,
however, are the unifying features of this inter-legality?
C. Co-evolutionaryInternal Differentiationof Global Law
In order to answer this question, we must correct perceptions about
the internal differentiation of law. Here, we are confronted with the
first direct impact of social differentiation upon law. For centuries law
had followed the political logic of nation-states and was manifest in the
multitude of national legal orders, each with their own territorial jurisdiction. Even international law, which viewed itself as the contract law
of Nation-States, did not depart from this model. The final break with
such conceptions was only signaled in the last century with the rapidly
accelerating expansion of international organizations and regulatory
regimes, which, in sharp contrast to their genesis within international
treaties, established themselves as autonomous legal orders. The national differentiation of law is now overlain by sectoral fragmentation.35
33.

For systems-theoretical concepts of a global legal system, see MATHIAS

POLITIK DER WELTGESELLSCHAFT:

VERGESELLSCHAFrUNG

203

IDENTITAT UND RECHT IM

(2002);

FISCHER-LESCANO,

ALBERT, ZUR

KONTEXT INTERNATIONALER
GLOBALVERFASSUNG:

GELTUNGSBEGRUNDUNG DER MENSCHENRECHTE IM POSTMODERNEN Ius GENTIUM,

20;

NIKLAS LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT

571-86 (1993);

DIE

supra note

Gralf-Peter Calliess,

Reflexive Transnational Law: The Privatisationof Civil Law and the Civilisation of Private
Law, 24 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 185 (2002); Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal
Pluralism in the World Society, supra note 20; Klaus A. Ziegert, Globalisierungdes Rechts
aus der Sicht der Rechtssoziologie, in GLOBALISIERUNG DES RECHTS 69 (Rudiger Voigt ed.,
2000); Anthony D'Amato, International Law as an Autopoietic System (2003) (unpublished
draft of a paper read at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International
Law on Nov. 15, 2003, available at http://anthonydamato.law.northwestern.edu/auto/
PLANCK-I .pdf). For a similar perspective on the global legal system, see Jenny S. Martinez,
Towards an InternationalJudicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 443 (2003), invoking SUNNY
Y. AUYANG, FOUNDATIONS OF COMPLEX-SYSTEM THEORIES: IN ECONOMICS, EVOLUTIONARY
BIOLOGY, AND STATISTICAL PHYSICS (1999).

34.
See Marc Amstutz, Vertragskollisionen: Fragmente fPr eine Lehre von der
Vertragsverbindung, in AKTUELLE ASPEKTE DES SCHULD- UND SACHENRECHTS: FESTSCHRIFr
FUR HEINZ REY ZUM 60. GEBURTSTAG 161 (Heinrich Honsell et al. eds., 2003); Boaventura de
Sousa Santos, State Transformation, Legal Pluralism and Community Justice, 1 SOCIAL AND
LEGAL STUDIES

35.

131 (1992).

For the most recent discussion of regimes, see ANDREAS HASENCLEVER ET AL.,
THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (1997); Andreas Hasenclever et al., Integrating Theories of InternationalRegimes, 26 REV. INT'L STUD. 3 (2000); Friedrich Kratochwil & Gerard
Ruggie, InternationalOrganization:A State of the Art on an Art of the State, 40 INT'L ORG.
753, 759 (1986); Ronald B. Mitchell, Sources of Transparency:Information Systems in International Regimes, 42 INT'L STUD. Q. 109 (1998); Ethan Nadelman, Global Prohibition
Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society, 44 INT'L ORG. 479 (1990); Oran
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In contrast to the constantly reiterated claims, the appearance of global
regimes does not entail the integration, harmonization or, at the very
least, the convergence of legal orders; rather, it transforms the internal
differentiation of law. Societal fragmentation impacts upon law in a
manner such that the political regulation of differentiated societal
spheres requires the parceling out of issue-specific policy-arenas, which,
for their part, juridify themselves. 6 The traditional differentiation in line
with the political principle of territoriality into relatively autonomous
national legal orders is thus overlain by a sectoral differentiation principle: the differentiation of global law into transnational legal regimes,
which define the external reach of their jurisdiction along issue-specific
rather than territorial lines, and which claim a global validity for themselves.3 7
D. Autonomous 'Private'Legal Regimes

This nonetheless is not sufficient to furnish us with a comprehensive
understanding of legal fragmentation. Global regulatory regimes certainly give us a picture of the fundamental transformation of global law
from territorial to a sectoral differentiation, but only to the degree that it
is induced by those forms of legal regimes which derive from international agreements. No light whatsoever is shed upon the equally rapid
growth in the numbers of non-statal private legal regimes. It is these regimes that give birth to "global law without the state," which is primarily
responsible for the multi-dimensionality of global legal pluralism.38 A

Young, InternationalRegimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions, 39 WORLD POL. 104
(1986).
36.
On the juridification of international organizations, see Kenneth Abbott et al., The
Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401 (2000).
37.
With specific reference to ICANN as a "Global Regulatory Regime" see MILTON
MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING OF CYBERSPACE

211-26 (2002); Dirk Lehmkuhl, The Resolution of Domain Names vs. Trademark Conflicts: A
Case Study on Regulation Beyond the Nation-State, and Related Problems, 23 ZEITSCHRIFT
FUR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 61, 71 (2002); Christian Walter, Constitutionalizing (Inter)national
Governance: Possibilitiesfor and Limits to the Development of an International Constitutional Law, 44 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 170, 186 (2001). On different aspects of the internet
regime, see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Economic and Other Barriers to Electronic Commerce, 21 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 563 (2000); David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and the Internet: An Essay
on Law-Making in Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 3, para. 1, at http://www.wm.edu/
law/publications/ol/articles/post.shtm; David G. Post, The "Unsettled Paradox": The
Internet, the State, and the Consent of the Governed, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 521
(1998); David G. Post, Of Black Holes and Decentralized Law-Making in Cyberspace, 2
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 70 (2000).
38.
On the discussion of legal pluralism, see CAROL WEISBROD, EMBLEMS OF PLURALISM: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND THE STATE (2002); Harold Berman, World Law, 18
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1617 (1995); Berman, supra note 18, at 325-71; Sally Engel Merry,
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full understanding of this legal pluralism is only possible if one abandons the assumption that global law exclusively derives its validity from
processes of State law-making and from state sanctions, whether these
derive from State internal sources of law or from officially sanctioned
international sources of law.39 This leads to a further impact of societal
fragmentation upon law, which requires us both to extend our concept of
law to encompass norms lying beyond the legal sources of Nation-State
and international law, and, at the same time, to reformulate our concept
of the regime. As Berman's formulation indicates, one of the central and
as yet unsolved future tasks of international law will be:
recognizing and evaluating non-state jurisdictional assertions
that bind sub-, supra-, or transnational communities. Such nonstate jurisdictional assertions include a wide range of entities,
from official transnational and international regulatory and adjudicative bodies, to non-governmental quasi-legal tribunals, to
private standard-setting or regulatory organizations.'0
"Transnational communities," or autonomous fragments of society,
such as, the globalized economy, science, technology, the mass media,
medicine, education and transportation, are developing an enormous
demand for regulating norms which cannot, however, be satisfied by national or international institutions. Instead, such autonomous societal
fragments satisfy their own demands through a direct recourse to law.
Increasingly, global private regimes are creating their own substantive
law. 4' They have recourse to their own sources of law, which lie outside
spheres of national law-making and international treaties 2
The most prominent contemporary private legal regimes are the lex
mercatoria of the international economy and the lex digitalis of the
Legal Pluralism,22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 869 (1988); LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY: CONSEQUENCES
OF PLURALISM IN LAW (Hanne Petersen and Henrik Zahle eds., 1995).
39.
Dieter Reuter, Das selbstgeschaffene Recht des internationalenSports im Konflikt
mit dem Geltungsanspruch des nationalen Rechts, 6 DEUTSCHE
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 1 (1996), is trapped in this statal perpective.

40.

ZEITSCHRIFT

FUR

Berman, supra note 18, at 235. See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Sovereignty StudCONST. COMMENT. 197, 201-02 (2000).

ies in ConstitutionalLaw: A Comment, 17

41.
THOMAS PRINCEN & MATHIAS FINGER, ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs IN WORLD POLITICS: LINKING THE LOCAL AND THE GLOBAL 10 (1994); MARTIN SHAW, GLOBAL SOCIETY
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPTS AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 5-

9 (1995); Miguel Darcy de Oliveira & Rajesh Tandon, An Emerging Global Civil Society, in
CITIZENS: STRENGTHENING GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 1 (Miguel Darcy de Oliveira & Rajesh
Tandon eds., 1994); Paul Wapner, Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and
World Civic Politics, 47 WORLD POL. 311, 312-13 (1995).
42.

ORAN YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN

184-211 (1994); Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the
World Society, supra note 20, at 3.

A STATELESS SOCIETY
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Internet.4 '3 To these, we must, however, also add numerous private or private-public instances of regulation and conflict resolution, which are
making autonomous law with a claim to global validity." In their character as "private" regimes, such institutions are starkly to be distinguished
from the "common international relations theory" understanding of "regimes," which defines them as "principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given
issue-area."4'5 The definition necessarily entails an extraordinary collapsing of both political and legal elements. The politically-centered
perspective, which this reflects, however, is not adequate relative to
autonomous private regimes. Nor can it yet be substituted for by an economically-centered perspective, as is often the case within a theory of
"private ordering," which achieves its goals with the aid of the simple
equation of private law with the economy. 46 An alternative is offered by
43.
For the most recent sources on the lex mercatoria, see Lawrence M. Friedman,
Erewhon: The Coming Global Legal Order, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 347, 356-59 (2001); Abul
F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Lex Mercatoria and InternationalContracts:A Challengefor International Commercial Arbitration?, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 657, 672-74 (1999); Philip J.
McConnaughay, Rethinking the Role of Law and Contracts in East-West Commercial Relationships, 41 VA J. INT'L L. 427, 471-77 (2001); . On the lex digitalis, see Henry H. Perritt,
Jr., Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms of ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 675, 691-92 (2000).
44.
Berman notes:
Elsewhere, we see the widespread use of international non-governmental regulatory
frameworks. For example, the Apparel Industry Partnership, a joint undertaking of
non-governmental organizations, international clothing manufacturers, and American universities, has established its own quasi-governmental (but non-state)
regulatory regime to help safeguard public values concerning international labor
standards. The partnership has adopted a code of conduct on issues such as child
labor, hours of work, and health and safety conditions, along with a detailed structure for monitoring compliance (including a third-party complaint procedure). In
the Internet context, the "TRUSTe" coalition of service providers, software companies, privacy advocates, and other actors has developed (and monitors) widely
adopted privacy standards for websites. Similarly, the Global Business Dialogue on
Electronic Commerce has formed a series of working groups to develop uniform
policies and standards regarding a variety of e-commerce issues. And, of course, the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, discussed previously, is a
non-state governmental body administering the domain name system.
Berman, supra note 18, at 369-70 (citations omitted).
45.
Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); For a
position critical towards Krasner's approach, see ANDREAS HASENCLEVER ET AL., supra note
35; Andreas Hasenclever et al., Integrating Theories of InternationalRegimes, supra note 35;
Kratochwil & Ruggie, supra note 35, at 759-61; Young, supra note 35, at 104-08.
46.
See Edward A. Bernstein, Law & Economics and the Structure of Value Adding
Contracts:A ContractLawyer's View of the Law & Economics Literature, 74 OR. L. REV. 189
(1995); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of ClassicalLaw and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989); Gillian K. Hadfield,
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the notion of "post-national formations" that evolve in divergent social
spheres:
[T]hese formations are now organized around principles of finance, recruitment, coordination,
communication,
and
reproduction that are fundamentally post-national and not just
multinational or international.47
The differentia specifica separating post-national formations from
the classical regime is the fact that so-called private regimes result from
the self-juridification of highly diverse societal fragments. The notion of
post-national formations allows for the generalization of a regime concept, which obsesses far too much about political processes, such that it
might capture the manner in which quite different apolitical autonomous
social spheres produce conflicting legal norms.
E. Center and Periphery
This, however, at once pre-programs the breakdown of the classical
legal hierarchy of norms. Even if it were possible, albeit with great effort, for political regulatory regimes to subordinate themselves to a State
hierarchy of legal norms, constituted in line with Kelsen's and Merkel's
stratified methodology, 8 and in which national legal acts, national legislation, national constitutional law and international law would be capped
by a law that could be construed as an international constitutional law,
the emergence of autonomous non-statal regimes necessarily collapses
the hierarchy. 9
What, however, will take the place of hierarchy of legal norms? The
center-periphery divide.50 While courts occupy the center of law, the periphery of the diverse autonomous legal regimes is populated by
political, economic, religious etc. organizational or spontaneous, collective or individual subjects of law, which, at the very borders of law,
Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583 (1992); Richard A. Posner, The Decline
of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987).
47.
Arjun Appadurai, Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy, in
MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION 27, 267 (Arjun Appadurai ed., 1996).
48.
See HANS KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE (2d ed. 1969); see also the collected articles of Hans Kelsen and Julius Merkl in DIE WIENER RECHTSTHEORETISCHE SCHULE:
AUSGEWAHLTE SCHRIFTEN VON HANS KELSEN, ADOLF JULIUS MERKL UND ALFRED VER-

DROSS (Hans Klecatsky et al. eds., 1968).

49.
Gunther Teubner, Global Private Regimes: Neo-spontaneous Law and Dual Constitution of Autonomous Sectors?, in GLOBALIZATION AND PUBLIC GOVERNANCE (Karl-Heinz
Ladeur ed., forthcoming 2004).
50.
LUHMANN, supra note 33, at 321-25; TEUBNER, supra note 2, at 36-42; FischerLescano, Die Emergenz der Globalverfassung,supra note 20, at 737.
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establish themselves in close contact to autonomous social sectors. Once
again, it is the fragmentation of global society that establishes the new
schisms between the legal center, the legal periphery and the social environments of law. In the zones of contact between the legal periphery and
autonomous social sectors, an arena for a plurality of law-making
mechanisms is established: standardized contracts, agreements of professional associations, routines of formal organizations, technical and
scientific standardization, normalizations of behavior, and informal consensus between NGOs, the media and social public spheres. By virtue of
their independent secondary norms that differ fundamentally from those
of national or international law, genuinely self-contained regimes can
establish themselves in line with the following technical definition:
A regime is a union of rules laying down particular rights, duties
and powers and rules having to do with the administration of
such rules, including in particular rules for reacting to breaches.
When such a regime seeks precedence in regard to the general
law, we have a 'self-contained regime,' a special case of lex specialis5
Since such regimes are structurally coupled with the independent logic
of the social sectors, they inevitably reproduce, albeit in a different form,
the structural conflicts existing between the various functional systems
within the law. Standard contracts within the lex mercatoria reflecting
the economic rationality of global markets collide with WHO norms that
derive from fundamental principles of the health system.52 The lex constructionis, the worldwide professional code of construction engineers,
collides with international environmental law.53 The WTO Appellate
Panel is confronted with cases encompassing collisions between human
rights regimes, environment protection regimes and economic regimes. 5
51.
Koskenniemi Outline, supra note 8, at 9; see also Preliminary Report by Martti
Koskenniemi, Chairman of the Study Group of the ILC, at ILC(LVI)/SG/FILJCRD. 1/Add. 1, at
para. 105 (May 4, 2004).
52.
See discussion infra Part 111.2.
53.
See discussion infra Part 111.3.
54.
A mass of literature dedicates itself to this collision constellation. For an especially
pointed review, see Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public InternationalLaw in the WTO: How
Far Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535 (2001); Markus Bockenforde, Zwischen Sein und
Wollen-Uber den Einfluss umweltvolkerrechtlicher Vertrage im Rahmen eines WTOStreitbeilegungsverfahrens,63 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VOLKERRECHT 971 (2003). On the collision of TRIPS and CBD, see Gerard Bodeker, Traditional Medical Knowledge, Intellectual Property Rights, and Benefit Sharing, 11 CARDOZO J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 785 (2003); see also Consultative Opinion on the Compatibility Between
Certain Provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights as to the Protection of Traditional Knowledge,
International Court of Environmental Arbitration and Conciliation, EAS-OC 8/2003 (Nov.
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International law dedicated to the maintenance of peace, more particularly its normative ban on the use of force, has a highly uneasy
relationship with international human rights law." Meanwhile, the same
is true of international humanitarian law and environmental protection
regimes,56 general human rights law and environmental law,57 etc. Indeed,
the tempestuous rationality conflicts have even fragmented the very center of global law, where courts and arbitration tribunals are located. In
this core, they act as a barrier to the hierarchical integration of diverse
regime tribunals, and foreclose a conceptual doctrinal consistency within
global law.
In contrast to the courts of developed Nation-States that guarantee
legal unity, globally dispersed courts, tribunals, arbitration panels and
alternative dispute resolution bodies are so closely coupled, both in
terms of organization and self-perception, with their own specialized
regimes in the legal periphery that they necessarily contribute to a global
legal fragmentation. These conflicts are a result of the "polycontexturalization" of law. They are created by the different internal environments of the legal system, which, for their part, are dependent upon
multiple paradigms of social ordering."
F. Auto-ConstitutionalRegimes
Legal collisions are lent a final increased intensity by virtue of their
constitutional anchoring. The fragmentation of global society has ramifications for constitutional theory as well. At a global level, the locus of
constitutionalization is shifting away from the system of international
relations to different social sectors, which are establishing civil constitu19, 2003), at http://iceac.sarenet.es [hereinafter International Court of Environmental Arbitration and Conciliation].
55.
See Martti Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple: Order Justice and the UN: A
Dialectical View, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 325 (1995); see also Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius
oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 23 (1999); Bruno Simma, NATO,
the UN and the Use of Force: LegalAspects, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (1999).
56.
See SILJA VONEKY, DIE FORTGELTUNG DES UMWELTVOLKERRECHTS IN
INTERNATIONALEN

BEWAFFNETEN

KONFLIKTEN

(2001). For further instruction on regime-

pluralisms in human rights law, see Michael Bothe, The HistoricalEvolution of International
HumanitarianLaw, InternationalHuman Rights Law, Refugee Law and International Criminal Law, in KRISENSICHERUNG UND HUMANITARER SCHUTZ-CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND
HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION-FESTSCHRIFr FOR DIETER FLECK

37 (Horst Fischer et al. eds.,

2004).
57.

See DIRK HANSCHEL, ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS-COOPERATIVE MEANS
OF REGIME IMPLEMENTATION (Working Papers-Mannheimer Zentrum fiir Europaische

Sozialforschung No. 29, 2000).
58.
KARL-HEINZ
LADEUR,

POSTMODERNE

SELBSTORGANISATION-PROZEDURALISIERUNG

RECHTSTHEORIE:

159-67 (1992).

SELBSTREFERENZ-

Summer 20041

Regime-Collisions

1015

tions of their own. 9 According to the concept of constitutional pluralism,
it is appropriate to speak of the "constitution" of collective bodies outside the confines of the nation-states when the following pre-conditions
have been fulfilled:
(i) the development of an explicit constitutional discourse and
constitutional self-consciousness; (ii) a claim to foundational legal authority, or sovereignty, whereas sovereignty is not viewed
as absolute; (iii) the delineation of a sphere of competences; (iv)
the existence of an organ internal to the polity with interpretative
autonomy as regards the meaning and the scope of the competences; (v) the existence of an institutional structure to govern
the polity; (vi) rights and obligations of citizenship, understood
in a broad sense; (vii) specification of the terms of representation of the citizens in the polity. 60
"Polity" in this context should not be understood in the narrow sense of
institutionalized politics; it refers as well to non-political configurations
of civil society, in the economy, in science, education, health, art or
sports, in all those social sites where constitutionalizing takes place.6'
Thus, self-contained regimes fortify themselves as auto-constitutional
regimes. As noted before, the defining feature of self-contained regimes
is not simply that they create highly specialized primary norms (substantive rules in special fields of law), but they also produce, in contrast to
the generalized secondary norms of international law, their own procedural norms on law-making, law-recognition and legal sanctions. Such
59.

On the concept of "societal constitutionalism" from a social theory perspective, see
(1992); DAVID SCIULLI, CORPOPOWER IN CIVIL SOCIETY: AN APPLICATION OF SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (2001).

DAVID SCIULLI, THEORY OF SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
RATE

For plural constitutionalism, see HAUKE BRUNKHORST, SOLIDARITAT. VON DER BURGERFREUNDSCHAFT ZUR GLOBALEN RECHTSGENOSSENSCHAFr 203-17 (2002); Calliess, supra note
33; Thomas Cottier & Maya Hertig, The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism,7 MAX
PLANCK Y.B. OF UNITED NATIONS L. 261 (2003); Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Luhmanns Staat
und der transnationaleKonstitutionalismus,in LUHMANNS STAATSTHEORIE (Marcelo Neves &

Ridiger Voigt eds., forthcoming 2004); Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism, supra note 20;
Neil Walker, The Idea of ConstitutionalPluralism,65 MOD. L. REV. 317 (2002); Walter, supra
note 37. Only in relation to the global economic constitutions, see LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY:
CONSEQUENCES OF PLURALISM IN LAW, supra note 38.
60.
Neil Walker, The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key, in THE EU
AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 31, 33 (Grainne de Burca & Joanne
Scott eds., 2001).
61.
This is accented by SCIULLI, THEORY OF SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra
note 59; BRUNKHORST, supra note 59, at 203-17; Fischer-Lescano, supra note 59; Teubner,
Societal Constitutionalism,supra note 20.
62.
Bruno Simma, Self-Contained Regimes, 16 NETHERLANDS Y.B. INT'L L. 111
(1985); see generally Koskenniemi Preliminary Report, supra note 8, Koskenniemi Outline,
supra note 8.
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a reflexive norm-building is not yet, however, constitutional normbuilding in the strict sense. They become constitutional only when they
establish a closer parallel to political constitutions, which are not simply
to be seen as higher legal norms, and must instead be understood as
structural coupling of the reflexive mechanisms of law with those of
politics. 3 The characteristics of auto-constitutional regimes is their linkage of legal reflexive processes with reflexive processes of other societal
spheres." Reflexive in this context means the application of specific
processes to themselves, the "norming" of norms, the application of political principles to the political process itself, epistemology as theorizing
theories, etc. Auto-constitutional regimes are defined by their duplication
of reflexivity. Secondary rule-making in law is combined with defining
fundamental rationality principles in an autonomous social sphere. Making the distinction between such societal constitutions and simple
regimes even clearer: regimes dispose of a union of primary and secondary legal norms, and their primary rule-making is structurally coupled
with the creation of substantive social norms in a specific societal sector.
Societal constitutions, in addition, establish a structural coupling between secondary rule-making in law and reflexive mechanisms in the
other social sector. A non-statal, non-political, civil society-led constitutionalization thus occurs to the degree that reflexive social processes,
which determine social rationalities through their self-application, are
juridified in such a way that they are linked with reflexive legal processes. Under these conditions it makes sense to speak of the existence of
constitutional elements-in the strictest sense of the term-within economic regimes, within the academic system and within digital regimes of
the Internet. In such diverse contexts we find typical elements of a
constitution: provisions on the establishment and exercise of decisionmaking (organizational and procedural rules) on the one hand, the
definition of individual freedoms and societal autonomies (fundamental
rights) on the other.6 1 Clearly, societal constitution-making at the same
time intensifies conflicts between legal regimes, since it fortifies the independence of the legal regime from other distinct legal regimes through
reflexive mechanisms.
63.

Niklas

Luhmann,

RECHTSHISTORISCHES JOURNAL

Verfassung

als

evolutionare

Errungenschaft,

9

176 (1990).

64.
Toward a system theoretical concept of regimes, see Gunther Teubner, Contracting
Worlds: Invoking Discourse Rights in Private Governance Regimes, 9 Soc. AND LEGAL STUD.
399 (2000); Gunther Teubner, Idiosyncratic Production Regimes: Co-evolution of Economic
and Legal Institutions in the Varieties of Capitalism,in THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURAL ENTITIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY 161 (John Ziman ed., 2002); see also ALBERT,
supra note 19, at 292-306.
65.
See Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Globalverfassung: Verfassung der Weltgesellschaft,
88 ARCHIV FOR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 349 (2002).
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Only when these various conceptual changes are taken to their logical conclusion, does one gain an adequate understanding of legal
fragmentation; an understanding which differs starkly from the day-today perspective of lawyers who locate the genesis of legal fragmentation
in the lack of a judicial hierarchy and characterize fragmentation as mere
jurisdictional conflicts. Summarizing within a single formula: the fragmentation of law is the epiphenomenon of real-world constitutional
conflicts, as legal fragmentation is-mediated via autonomous legal regimes-a legal reproduction of collisions between the diverse
rationalitieswithin global society.
III. SELECTIVE NETWORKING OF COLLIDING REGIMES

Our interim result: lasciate ogni speranza. Any aspiration to the organizational and doctrinal unity of law is surely a chimera. The reason is
that global society is a "society without an apex or a center.' 66 Following
the de-centering of politics, there is no authority in sight in a position to
undertake the coordination of societal fragments. Law is even less appropriately placed to fulfill this role, even indirectly through the
integration of its global fragments.
Following the collapse of legal hierarchies, the only realistic option
is to develop heterarchical forms of law that limit themselves to creating
loose relationships between the fragments of law. This might be achieved
through a selective process of networking that normatively strengthens
already existing factual networks between the legal regimes: lawexternally, the linkage of legal regimes with autonomous social sectors;
and, law-internally, the linkage of legal regimes with one another. Recent
developments of network theory may be relevant for international law.
Network theory has identified the paradoxical logic of action in networks, the unitas multiplex of hierarchical configurations." As "highly

66.
67.

NIKLAS LUHMANN, POLITISCHE THEORIE IM WOHLFAHRTSSTAAT 22 (1981).
On "network society:' see MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK
SOCIETY 67-150 (Blackwell 1996); DIRK MESSNER, DIE NETZWERKGESELLSCHAFT:
WIRTSCHAFTLICHE
PROBLEME

ENTWICKLUNG

GESELLSCHAFTLICHER

UND

INTERNATIONALE

STEUERUNG

(1995);

WETTBEWERBSFAHIGKEIT

KARL-HEINZ

LADEUR,

ALS

NEGATIVE

UND GESELLSCHAFTLICHE SELBSTORGANISATION 204-250 (2000); KarlHeinz Ladeur, Die Regulierung von Selbstregulierung und die Herausbildung einer ,,Logik
der Netzwerke," 4 DIE VERWALTUNG 59, 62-77 (2001); Renate Mayntz, Interessenverbande
und Gemeinwohl: Die Verbdndestudie der Bertelsmann Stiftung, in VERBANDE ZWISCHEN
MITGLIEDERINTERESSEN UND GEMEINWOHL 11 (Renate Mayntz ed., 1992); Walter Powell,
Weder Markt noch Hierarchie:Netzwerkartige Organisationsformen,in ORGANISATION UND
NETZWERK: INSTITUTIONELLE STEUERUNG IN WIRTSCHAFT UND POLITIK 213 (Patrick Kenis
& Volker Schneider eds., 1996).
FREIHEITSRECHTE
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improbable contexts of reproduction of heterogeneous elements, ' networks are counter-institutions of autonomous systems. Combining
different logics of actions, they mediate between autonomous function
systems,' formal orgaizations,7 0 and, as in our case, between autonomous regimes. Three guiding principles for the decentralized networking
of legal regimes may be identified in the abstract:
1. Simple normative compatibility instead of hierarchical unity
of law
2. Law-making through mutual irritation, observation and reflexivity of autonomous legal orders.
3.

Decentralized modes of coping with conflicts of laws as a legal method.7'

If hierarchical thinking is abandoned, a normative concept of networks of legal regimes needs to be included within the law's selfdescription. Such a normative re-orientation can build on various tentative efforts within legal practice and doctrine, certain of which will be
discussed in the following.
A. From InternationalConflicts to Inter-Regime Conflicts
Two questions are typically posed in this context. First, how should
we react in the absence of legal hierarchy; that is, in the absence of collectively binding decisions, centralized competences and hierarchically
ordered legal principles? In the abstract, the answer is: strengthen mutual
observation between network nodes.7 ' The final binding decision is replaced by a sequence of decisions within a variety of observational
positions in a network; a process in which network nodes mutually reconstruct, influence, limit, control, and provoke one another, but which
never leads to one final collective decision on substantive norms. In this
68.

DIRK BAECKER, ORGANISATION UND GESELLSCHAFT

69.

HELMUT WILLKE,

IRONIE DES

STAATES:

14 (2002).

GRUNDLINIEN

EINER STAATSTHEORIE

183-210 (1992); LUHMANN, supra note 23, at 788; Andr6
Brodocz, Strukturelle Kopplung durch Verbande, 2 SOZIALE SYSTEME 361, 366 (1996).
POLYZENTRISCHER GESELLSCHAFT

70.
Eckard Kimper & Johannes Schmidt, Netzwerke als strukturelle Kopplung:
Systemtheoretische Uberlegungen zum Netzwerkbegriff, in SOZIALE NETZWERKE: KONZEPTE
UND
METHODEN
DER SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHEN NETZWERKFORSCHUNG
211, 227
(Johannes Weyer ed., 1999).
71.
For the European context, see Marc Amstutz, Zwischenwelten: Zur Emergenz einer
interlegalen Rechtsmethodik im europaischen Privatrecht, in RECHTSVERFASSUNGSRECHT:
RECHT-FERTIGUNG ZWISCHEN PRIVATRECHTSDOGMATIK UND GESELLSCHAFTSTHEORIE 213,
216 (Gunther Teubner & Christian Joerges eds., 2003); Christian Joerges, The Impact of
European Integration on Private Law: Reductionist Perceptions, True Conflicts and a New
ConstitutionalPerspective,3 EUR. L.J. 378 (1997).
72.
LADEUR, supra note 58, at 82.
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context, transparency and mutual accessibility are the primary commandment; participation and deliberation are imbued with a new
significance. The second question is how decisions are to be taken when
due to the absence of a most significant relationship--transnational conflicts cannot be attributed to one national law in areas like copyright,
cyberlaw, human rights and environmental law. Once again in the abstract, the answer is to attempt no longer the most authentic possible
reconstruction of national norms. Rather, the choice of national law must
be superseded by an orientation to transnational but sectoral regimes
which lead to different principles of conflicts law. Both reactions are
highlighted through the example of copyright law.
First Example: Transnational Copyright
Conflicts decisions within international copyright law have traditionally been taken in line with the territoriality principle. The definitive
expression of this principle is found in the Berne Convention of 1886
(Convention)] 3 However, the Convention is no match for the cyberrevolution, for technical innovations in transmission media and for the
trans-nationalization of science and art. Even though there were contemporary attempts to do so, the Convention did not establish a harmonized
copyright law, but instead focused upon the mutual recognition of differing territorial systems. Article 5 of the Convention furnishes the primary
norm:
Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union other
than the country of origin, the rights which their respective laws
do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the
rights specially granted by this Convention.74
Certainly, states have attempted to match the transnational lawmaking process by founding the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which has long administered almost all multi-national
agreements on intellectual property, by means of the Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of International Property Rights (TRIPS) concluded during the GATT Uruguay Round in April 1994," through

73.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27, 1980 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Beme Convention].
74.
Berne Convention, supra note 73, at art. 5(1).
75.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement].
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various cooperation efforts between the WTO and WlpO, 6 through the
European Convention relating to questions on copyright law," through
"WIPO Internet Treaties,"' ' and by means of European measures,79 as
well as related law-making acts. ° There is, however, still no harmonized
international copyright. Territorially bound and nationally divergent
copyright guarantees remain determinative. International agreements
simply mediate between different protection standards and establish reciprocal national entitlements to the implementation of minimum levels
of protection. As Dinwoodie and Berman have indicated, the new situation would require that the "facade of copyright rules based upon
territoriality needs to be stripped away, and a new approach constructed.
Some uncertainty is an inevitable, but worthwhile, short-term cost." 8'
What might this "new approach" look like? At core, this entails an
effort to avoid a "race to the bottom," not by assuming that the full range
of relevant norms is exclusively to be found within national partial legal
orders, but instead through a consideration of the possible spill-over effects within other territorial legal orders. It follows that further
transnational law-making mechanisms, over and above national legal
norms, are also included within the equation. In substance this would
include reorienting the traditional conflicts law away from conflicts between national legal orders, and refocusing them upon conflicts between
sectoral regimes, such as is the case in the context of collisions between
ICANN and national courts, ICTY and ICJ, WTO and WHO.82 As Din76.
Agreement Between the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World
Trade Organization, Dec. 22, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 754, 756-57 (1996).
77.
European Convention of 5 May 1994 Relating to Questions on Copyright Law and
Neighboring Rights in the Framework of Transfrontier Broadcasting by Satellite, opened for
signature Nov. 5, 1994, Eur. T.S. No. 153, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/
CadreListeTraites.htm.
78.
WIPO Diplomatic Conference of 20 December 1996 on Certain Copyright and
Neighboring Rights Questions: WIPO Copyright Treaty, available at http://www.wipo.int/
documents/en/diplconf/distrib/pdf/94dc.pdf; Diplomatic Conference of 20 December 1996 on
Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions: WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, availableat http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/diplconf/distrib/pdf/95dc.pdf.
79. Council Regulation 40/94 of 20 December 1994 on the Community Trademark, 1994 O.J.
(L 11) 1; Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation on the Community
Design, COM(93)342; Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the Coordination of Certain Rules Concerning Copyright and Rights Related to Copyright Applicable to
Satellite Broadcasting and Cable Retransmission, 1993 O.J. (L 248) 36,1; Council Directive
91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 1991 O.J. (L
122) 34,1.
80.
See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of InternationalNorms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 63 OHIo ST. L.J. 733, 748 (2001).
81.
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 573 (2000); Berman, supra note 18.
82.
See International Court of Environmental Arbitration and Conciliation, supra note
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woodie and Berman have suggested, a shift from territoriality to "functional regime affiliation" would mean that the division of jurisdictional
competences and the normative preconditions for substantive decisions
could no longer be inferred from each local legal order.83
The question of jurisdiction would not be answered by mechanically
subsuming the case under the rules of the forum coincidentally addressed; rather, it would be dependent upon the characteristics of the
functional regime. The particular jurisdiction would then no longer be
dependent upon the issue of whether some form of legal link to the national law of whichever forum might be established, but would rather be
determined by the question of whether the forum addressed can be understood as a part of a sectoral legal order. Any "mechanical counting of
contacts with a geographically based sovereign entity ' 84 would be
dispensed with and replaced with the connecting norms for regimejurisdiction.
In conflicts law, when it comes to determining the applicable substantive law via collision rules, it is equally important to apply this logic
of functional connection to each set of collision rules. The problems that
arise out of the judicial reconstruction of the other national legal order in
cases of transnational legal questions can be overcome through a form of
conflicts law that is not based on the determination of one territorial law
which has the closest relation to the conflict, but which seeks instead to
identify the functional regime to which the legal issue in question belongs. Therefore one needs to investigate the substantive rules within this
regime and other regimes, and to cope with the plurality of substantive
national, international and transnational regime law-making.
This results in the creation of new forms of collision rules, whose
determination of the applicable law would choose not between nations,
but between functional regimes. In their character as collision rules in
the technical sense, however, they would still work with the classical
methods of conflicts law, and as such would be required to decide between legal orders and to apportion the legal issue in question to one of
the orders involved, be they nations or be they regimes. A far more dramatic step, however, is the reorientation from collision rules to
substantive rules. Traditional private international law knows such a
"substantive law approach" in only a very few exceptional cases, in
which the transnational nature of the contested subject matter is so

83.
84.

Dinwoodie, supra note 81; Berman, supra note 18.
Berman, supra note 18, at 496.
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overwhelming that it is virtually impossible to apportion the legal issue
in question to one or another legal order.85
In our case of inter regime conflicts, however, the exception becomes the rule. Conflicts whose core content might be exclusively
apportioned to one regime are, by contrast, exceptional. It is only a rare
exception, that a conflict that has economic and ecological implications,
can be said to have the one "most significant relation" to either the economy or the ecology; usually both relations are "most significant." The
rule is over-arching regime conflicts which have relevant effects within
both regimes. This leaves only one possible solution: developing substantive rules through the law of inter-regime-conflicts itself. This,
however, would take place in the absence of hierarchical instances judging in a neutral distance to the legal orders involved. We face a
paradoxical situation, whereby the legal instance within each regime,
which is also a party to the legal collision, must create substantive norms
which claim validity for both regimes involved. Transnational substantive norms are created, within a form of mixed law approach, with an eye
both to one's own and to the other legal regime, but also with an eye to
third party legal orders .86 In a mirror of the methodology applied by international customary law, different law-making mechanisms are to be
included in the determination of the applicable rule.87 In any case, however, care must be taken to overcome the limitations imposed by political
law-making and the related hierarchy established between national and
international orders. 8 Instead, the goal would be a strange legal Esperanto of regimes within which national, international and trans-national
legal acts clamor for attention. Concerned courts-national courts and
transnational instances of conflict resolution-would be required to meet
the challenges of creating transnational substantive norms out of this
85.
See GERHARD KEGEL & KLAUS SCHURIG, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 65 (8th
ed. 2000); ERNST STEINDORFF, SACHNORMEN IM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT (1958).
86.
Christian Joerges develops a similar approach in EU law. The colliding entities are
not identified in autonomous national legal systems, not in hierarchic levels of federal orders,
but in semi-autonomous levels of European multi-level-governance. The solution is thus the
development of substantial norms at one level with observing the altera pars of other levels.
See Christian Joerges, Zur Legitimitat der Europaisierungdes Privatrechts:Uberlegungen zu
einem
Recht-Fertigungs-Recht far
das
Mehrebenensystem
der
EU,
in
RECHTSVERFASSUNGSRECHT 183 (Christian Joerges & Gunther Teubner eds., 2003).
87.
See, e.g., Charles Rousseau, De la compatibiliti des norms juridiques
contradictoires dans l'ordre international, 39 REVUE GtNERAL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 133, 151 (1932) (speaking of different legal norms "d'6gale valeurjuridique," but, of
course, referring only to the traditionally non-hierarchical international law existing prior to
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.)
88.
This approach is distinguished from Philip Jessup's "transnational law," which
conceives of a principle of international law primacy. See PHILIP C. JESSUP, MODERNES
VOLKERRECHT 21 (1950).
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chaos, seeking for the individual case at hand appropriate legal norms
beyond their territorial, organizational and institutional legal spheres and
taking responsibility for combining them norms in order to develop a
transnational body of law.
B. From Policy Conflicts to Rationality Collisions
As noted, the collisions arising in such cases cut right across traditional politics that build up power and consensus to produce binding
collective decisions. Accordingly, the famous "governmental interest
approach" developed within conflicts law, which has successfully overcome the formalistic view of mere norm conflicts through the attention it
pays to the substantive policy conflicts existing between the states involved, is not helpful in the case of regime collisions. 9 As intimated
above, the colliding units are only in part political regulatory regimes
that are constituted by international treaties, and which pursue explicit
policies. A large part of them is made up by autonomous private governance regimes-producing global law without the state-that have their
roots in a variety of non-political sectors of world society. Then we are
no longer confronted with social conflicts translated into institutionalized politics-with power conflicts, ideology debates and policy
controversies-but instead with very specific forms of social conflict,
that, for their part, provoke the establishment of private governance regimes. Only in some cases the conflicts may invite a reaction from
international politics in the form of issue-specific regulatory regimes.
The result is a collision between private governance regimes on the
one hand and political-regulatory regimes on the other. All the jurisdiction conflicts that ICJ presidents and international legal experts have
warned us about, conflicts between ICANN and national judges, between the ICTY and the ICJ, between the WTO and WHO, between the
ICJ and the International Maritime Court, between the lex mercatoria
and human rights, between the lex constructionis and ecological concerns, differ fundamentally in their form from mere policy conflicts.
Consequently, it is simply not enough to reduce the conflicts law that
must be developed to a matter of reconstructing the different "policies"
and political "interests" that are found in conflict constellations and finding accommodation between them.9° Instead, law must concern itself
with the underlying social conflicts themselves.
89.
See Lea Brilmayer, The Role of Substantive and Choice of Law Policies in the Formation and Application of Choice of Law Rules, 252 RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (1995);
CHRISTIAN JOERGES, ZUM FUNKTIONSWANDEL DES KOLLISIONSRECHTS: DIE 'GOVERNMENTAL
INTEREST ANALYSIS' UND DIE 'KRISE DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS'

90.

For this approach, see Martinez, supra note 33, at 472.

(1971).
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This means primarily that law needs to understand the legal norm
collisions of the regimes involved-that is, political regulatory bodies, or
international organizations or, indeed, concerned states-as an expression of the fundamental conflicts between organizational principles of
social systems. Conflicts law then would have as its main objective to
establish compatibility between colliding rationality principles of global
sectors. Normative expectations are established within the global spheres
of science, art, technology, economy, education and religion and are juridified within specific legal orders. Transnational law in the form of a
specific functional regime is thus anything but a Nation-State enterprise,
even though transnational law-making is subject to massive political
pressures. Regime expectations are only binding on partial segments of
global society, and the substitution of functional regime affiliation for
territorial differentiation is dependant upon each decisional forum evolving a sufficiently refined understanding of its own regime logic. If we
look again at "transnational copyright law" this would mean that the legal reformulation of collisions between WIPO, WTO, EU and national
laws must be redrawn to this degree. Transnational copyright law should
concern itself with the underlying collisions between distinct rationalities, i.e. conflicts between the rationales of science, technology, art and
the economy. In the final analysis, this involves establishing a measure
of compatibility between them and an end to the practice of simply orienting law in line with the policies of organizations and states. This
"compatibilization technique" which differs from policy analysis and
interest weighing is sketched in the following with reference to the example of patent protection for medicines.
Second Example: Patent Protection for Medicines
In 2001, the US requested the establishment of a WTO Panel to
investigate the legal situation as regards patents within Brazil. Although Brazil had, under pressure from the US, overhauled its patents
law in 1997, 9' it had nonetheless retained its potential competence to
grant obligatory licenses should the patent owner not be engaged in
local production within Brazil. Beginning with Article 68, the Brazilian
Patent Law92 thus allows for domestic production of so-called
"generica, 93 that is, copies of patent protected medicines; but limits this
to cases where the population is threatened by an epidemic and the price
91.
Fernando Braune & Naira Menezes, The Patentability of Chemical, Biochemical,
Pharmaceuticaland BiotechnologicalInventions in Brazil, 108 PATENT WORLD 46 (1999).
92.
Regula direitos e obrigaqOes relativos A propriedade industrial, Decreto No. 9.279
de 14 de maio de 1996, Didrio Oficial da Unido [D.O.U] [Federal Law] de 15.05.1996 (Br.)

(in force since May 1997).
93.

See also Decreto No. 9.787 de 11 de fevereiro de 1999, D.O.U. 11.02.1999 (Br.).
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of the medicine on the world market is too high. The law refers to "abuse
of economic power" (praticarabuso de poder econbmico) on the part of
pharmaceutical concerns. Further, Articles 68 et seq. of the Brazilian
Patent Law provide for domestic production of patented medicines
should a foreign firm have been selling a pharmaceutical within Brazil
for longer than three years without having established a local production
plant. 150,000 people have died of AIDS within Brazil since 1981. In
1997, the annual number of new infections lay over 20,000, but could be
reduced through preventative measures to less than 5,000. The annual
cost to the Brazilian Government of treating AIDS infected patients was
around $300 million. The two components, Efavirenz and Nelfinavir,
patented by the US concern, Merck, and the Swiss company, Roche,
were responsible for over a third of this sum. Since neither company was
engaged in local production, the Brazilian Health Minister announced
the domestic production of generic copies. The US Government considered Articles 68 et seq. of the Brazilian Patent Law to be potentially
discriminatory to US patent owners and accordingly requested the commencement of bilateral consultations in May 2000.94 Once these had, in
the opinion of the US, failed, the US requested commencement of panel
proceedings on January 9, 2001 .
There are three possible ways of reading the conflict. The first would
be to regard it as a conflict between Brazilian nationallaw and the rights
of the patent owners (in international law terms mediated by the US).
Being in possession of rights-much in the manner of the thirty-nine
pharmaceutical concerns who, represented by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association of South Africa (PMASA), have entered into
judicial proceedings in the light of a similar constellation within South
Africa,96-they attempted to protect their property rights against Brazilian assault. This perspective would thus require us to determine the
content of, and limits to, international patent protection. This effort is
quickly confronted with the provision of Articles 30 of TRIPS:
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not
94.
WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Brazil-Measure Affecting Patent ProtectionRequest for Consultations by the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS 199/1 (June 8, 2000).
95.
WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Brazil-Measure Affecting Patent ProtectionRequest for Consultations by the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS199/3 (Jan. 9, 2001). The
DSB received this request during its meeting on the 1st February and following representations from the US and Brazil, decided to establish a Panel in accordance with Article 6 DSB.
See WTO Settlement Dispute Body, Minutes of the Meeting, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M/97 (Feb.
27,2001).
96.
Naomi Bass, Implications of the TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries:
PharmaceuticalPatent Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the 21st Century, 34 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REv. 191, 192-93 (2002).
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unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent
and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third
parties 97
.
Whereby, TRIPS Article 31 allows its members to use a patented
material, even without a necessary authorization from the patent owner
if:
prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain
authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial
terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time. This requirement
may be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency
or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public
non-commercial use. In situations of national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder shall,
nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable. In
the case of public non-commercial use, where the government or
contractor, without making a patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will be used
by or for the government, the right holder shall be informed
promptly.98
The question would accordingly be one of whether Articles 68 et
seq. of the Brazilian Patent Law infringed the TRIPS agreement, even
though they make explicit recourse to the notion of an "abuse of economic power" and the conflict erupted as the Brazilian regime attempted
to give force to its national program to combat AIDS. Concerned parties,
however, are united in their critique of the porous nature of TRIPS
norms: on the one hand, because TRIPS does not give rise to a sufficient
level of protection for intellectual property and does not pay adequate
regard to the economic interests of patent holders; 99 and on the other,
because it does not pay sufficient attention to the economic interests of
the countries of the Southern Hemisphere. m To this degree, patent laws
share the same fate as copyright laws: in the case of both legal institutions, international law-making is "out of touch with modern times and

97.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 75, at art. 30
98.
Id. at art. 31.
99.
Theresa Beeby Lewis, Patent Protectionfor the PharmaceuticalIndustry: A Survey
of PatentLaws of Various Countries,30 INT'L LAW. 835, 841-42 (1996).
100.
Bass, supra note 96.

Summer 2004]

Regime-Collisions

1027

the changing norms of an innovative community."'' How the Panel itself
might have decided remains a hypothetical question since the US and
Brazil gave the Chairman of the DSB notice, in line with DSU Article 6,
of their having reached a mutually satisfactory solution to the problem
on July 5, 2001 .102
What had happened?
This relates to the second reading of the conflict: the Brazilian conflict was a conflict between the WTO and WHO; an institutional conflict
between the policies of two international organizations.'3 This would
not be an unusual constellation and a brief review of the AlstonPetersmann controversy"° will allow ample information about each perspective, which either entrusts only the UN (Alston) or principally the
WTO (Petersmann) with the task of finding an adequate balance between colliding freedoms and rights.'05 The really unusual facet of the
case was thus not the regime collision as such, but rather, the fact that
the US did not wait for it to unfold. There could not have been a more
inopportune moment for WTO proceedings on patent protection for
AIDS medicines in view of the scheduling of a UN Special General Assembly on the combating of HIV/AIDS for a few months later.'06 Special
General Assemblies are not everyday occurrences, are concerned with
portentous questions, are prepared over many years, and encompass both
101.
Frank Romano, International Conventions and Treaties, Global Trademark and
Copyright 1998: Protecting intellectualproperty rights in the InternationalMarketplace, 1998
PLI/PAT 536, 539.
102.
WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Brazil-Measures Affecting Patent ProtectionNotification of Mutually Agreed Solution, WTO Doc. WT/DS199/4 (July 19, 2001).
103.
On the political instrumentalization of regimes, see Laurence Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property
Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2004). On the battle against AIDS, see World
Health Organization, Treat 3 Million by 2005 Initiative, WC 503.2 (2003). Principle responsibility in the battle against aids has been given by the UN institutions to UNAIDS, which acts
as a network coordinating node amongst a whole variety of secondary and special UN organizations.
104.
On current cases impacting equally upon the UN and WTO, see David P. Fidler,
Global Outbreak of Avian Influenza A (H5N1) and International Law (January 2004), at
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh125.htm; David P. Fidler, Developments Involving SARS,
International Law, and Infectious Disease Control at the Fifty-Sixth Meeting of the World
Health Assembly (June 2003), at http://www.asil.org/insights/insighl08.htm; see also WTO
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Philippines-Notificationof Emergency
Measures, WTO Doc. G/SPS/N/PHL/50 (Jan. 13, 2004).
105.
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a UnitedNations 'Global Compact'forIntegrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European
Integration, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 621 (2002); Philip Alston, Resisting the Mergerand Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 815 (2002);
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Taking Human Rights, Poverty and Empowerment of Individuals
More Seriously: Rejoinder toAlston, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 845 (2002).
106.
Declarationof Commitment on HIV/AIDS, U.N. GAOR, Special Session, June 2527, 2001, at http://www.un.org/ga/aids/coverage. The final declaration of the General Assembly can be accessed on the internet page of the UN-Prograrn UNAIDS: http://www.unaids.org.
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civil society and state actors. The machinery of civil society mobilization
went into immediate action and scandalized AIDS sufferers everywhere
with the protectionist orientation of US economic policy. 0 7 Brazil was
not slow in taking advantage of this well of feeling and was able to
achieve the acceptance of a Resolution at the next sitting of the UN
Commission on Human Rights.0 8 The Resolution, accepted by 53 to 52
votes (that is, against the will of the US), sets out, amongst other things,
a desire:
(i) to facilitate access in other countries to essential preventive,
curative or palliative pharmaceuticals or medical technologies
used to treat pandemics such as HIV/AIDS or the most common
opportunistic infections that accompany them wherever possible
as well as to extend the necessary cooperation wherever possible, especially in times of emergency;
(ii) to ensure that their actions as members of international organizations take due account of the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health.' °9
The Resolution was explicitly directed towards the growing conflict and
was a diplomatic barometer of the fact that the pressure on the US government was growing ever stronger. It is thus not surprising that,
punctually on the first day of the UN General Assembly Special Session
on AIDS, the US joined with Brazil to lodge its written intention to set
the conflict on patent protection for AIDS cocktails aside. "0
The third reading of the conflict is neither rights related, nor institutional, but instead conceives of the collision as a conflict between
competing rationalities. The political compromise between Brazil and
the US, which forced patent owners to offer concerned states affordable
licenses,"' was complemented by the so-called Doha Declaration of the
WTO:

107.
See, e.g., Call to Action: Thai AIDS Treatment Activists Invite Allies to Join a
March and Protest: Demand Accountability and Action on AIDS, at http://www.

globaltreatmentaccess.org.
108.

Specific Groups and Individuals: Other Vulnerable Groups and Individuals, U.N.

Commission on Human Rights, 57th Sess., Agenda Item 14(d), at 169, U.N.
E/CN.4/2001/80 (2000).
109.
Id.
110.
Letter from Peter Allgeier, Executive Office of the President, Deputy United
Trade Representative, to the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body of the World
Organization WT/DS 199/4 (June 25, 2001), availableat http://docsonline.wto.org.
111.
On the connection between the Brazilian and South African cases, see Bass,
note 96, at 206.

Doc.
States
Trade
supra
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We stress the importance we attach to implementation and interpretation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) in a manner
supportive of public health, by promoting both access to existing
medicines and research and development into new medicines
and, in this connection, are adopting a separate declaration." 2
This separate declaration, the "Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health," 3 provides a needle sharp reconstruction of the problem and refers to a conflict that is deeper than a simple policy conflict
between two international organizations. The question of patent protection for AIDS medicines furnishes the arena in which the fundamental
principles of two global operational spheres, economy and health, collide. Each conflict constellation can be traced back to this collision:
Brazil v. US, WTO v. WHO, US v. UN, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers'
Association of South Africa v. South Africa. Each appearance of the constellation before each legal forum was concerned with the reaching of
agreement between the conflicting demands of each system (patent protection versus effective health protection). Any potential WTO panel
decision of the DSB would be confronted with three issues:
1. The question is not one of deciding between the reach of opposing territories or between different institutional solutions
to the patents problem. Instead, the argument sketched in the
first case must be taken to its full conclusion, such that the
substantive norms of a global patent law are evolved in a
quasi-judicial process.
2. It is not sufficient merely to refer to the contemporary policies
pursued by international organizations, such as the WTO or
WHO. Instead the conflict-resolving legal instance must, in
the final analysis, revisit underlying rationality conflicts and
attempt their compatibilization.
3. Since there is no central instance for deciding the conflict in
existence, the problem can only be solved from the decentralized perspective of one of the conflicting regimes; in this
case, the WTO. The competing rationality principles, however,-in this case, that of global health protection-must be
112.
WTO
Ministerial
Conference,
4th
Sess.,
Ministerial Declaration,
WT/MIN(01)/Dec/1, para. 17. (Nov. 20, 2001).
113.
WTO Ministerial Conference, Declaration of the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001); on the implementation of the Declaration, see
WTO General Council, General Council Chairpersons Statement, WT/GC/M/82 (Nov. 13,
2003).
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introduced as a logical limitation within the specific institutional context-in this case the economic context of WTO
law.
In addition to reserving a national competence to define emergency
situations,"' the Doha Declaration establishes a deadline for less developed countries until the year 2016: their rules will take precedence only
up until that date. Equally, the General Council has now established a
detailed regulatory framework for the issuing of compulsory licenses."'
In our reading, the economically oriented WTO regime has created
an internal limitation on its own logic through the reformulation of a
principle of health protection. This compatibilization technique allows to
build responsive external linkages within its own perspective of economic rationality. Such a "re-entry" of conflicting law within one's own
legal system allows for the translation of rationality collisions within the
quaestio iuris; it avoids the unfortunate situation whereby external cognition can only take place on the collapse of a regime."6 In the example
of the WTO, this means that the re-entry of environmental rationalities
within the self-organization of this regime should be promoted; that is, a
re-entry extending far beyond the very narrow terms of Articles 7, 11 and
3.2 of the DSU." 7 The reconstruction of non-WTO law within the WTO
legal system would then not be an external imposition of limits but the
internal achievement of the WTO regime itself and would reflect upon a
process of mutual constitution." 8
114.

See WTO Ministerial Conference, supra note 113, at para. 5(c):

Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other
epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency.
115.
WTO General Council, Implementation of Paragraph6 of the Doha Declarationon
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/LI540 (Sept. 2, 2003); on details, see Haochen
Sun, The Road to Doha and Beyond: Some Reflections on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 123 (2004).
116.
This, for example, is the understanding given by Marschnik to the meaning of the
regime-extemal environment, which, for example, would see international common law applied upon the failure of an international legal regime. See AXEL MARSCHIK, SUBSYSTEME IM
VOLKERRECHT: IST DIE EUROPAISCHE UNION EIN 'SELF-CONTAINED REGIME'? 162 (1997); on
the special case of ius non dispositivum, see discussion, infra Part III.C.
117.
See Bockenforde, supra note 54, at 979.
118.
See Hersch Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretationof Treaties,26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 48, 76 (1949):
It is the treaty as a whole which is law. The treaty as a whole transcends any of its
individual provisions or even the sum total of its provisions. For the treaty, once
signed and ratified, is more than the expression of the intention of the parties. It is
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The literature is full of controversies on the status and role of general
international law within the WTO regime. Such controversy, however,
tends to derive from the concepts of direct/indirect effect," 9 prevailing/overriding application 2 ' and internationally conforming legal
interpretation, 2' that have arisen within the conflicts between international and national law, and between EU and national law. It is thus not
only too narrow, especially with regard to its fixation upon international
public law,'22 but also chooses the wrong starting point for analysis
through its over-emphasis on colliding state-derived normative commands. 23 Rather, the re-entry of non-WTO law within WTO-law means:
the identification of colliding social realities; the re-entry of alien sectoral regime orders within a legal regime; the reformulation of the
conflict within the questio iuris; and the internal compatibilization of
legally reformulated systemic rationalities. In the concrete case this entails that health protection measures must in certain cases be themselves
protected from economic pressures. Respect for this would thus suggest
part of international law and must be interpreted against the general background of
its rules and principles.
Id.
119.
Bockenf6rde, supra note 54.
120.
Pauwelyn, supra note 54, at 566 ("prevails," "overrides" etc.).
121.
Gerrit Betlem & Andr6 Nollkaemper, Giving Effect to Public InternationalLaw
before Domestic Courts: A ComparativeAnalysis of the Practiceof Consistent Interpretation,
14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 569 (2003).
122.
See Harold Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181, 183-84
(1996):
Transnational legal process describes the theory and practice of how public and private actors-nation-states, international organizations, multinational enterprises,
non-governmental organizations, and private individuals-interact in a variety of
public and private, domestic and international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and
ultimately, internalize rules of transnational law.
Id.
123.
Similarly narrow and conflict shy, see Panel Report, Korea-Measures Affecting
Government Procurement, WTIDS1631R, para. 7.96 (6/19/2000):
We take note that Article 3.2 of the DSU requires that we seek within the context of
a particular dispute to clarify the existing provisions of the WTO agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.
However, the relationship of the WTO Agreements to customary international law
is broader than this. Customary international law applies generally to the economic
relations between the WTO Members. Such international law applies to the extent
that the WTO treaty agreements do not 'contract out' from it. To put it another way,
to the extent there is no conflict or inconsistency, or an expression in a covered
WTO agreement that implies differently, we are of the view that the customary
rules of international law apply to the WTO treaties and to the process of treaty
formation under the WTO.
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an extensive interpretation of the exceptional provisions of Article 31 of
TRIPS in situations in which health measures are necessary "which
promote broad access to safe, efficient and affordable preventive, curative or palliative pharmaceuticals and medical technologies."'24 While
patent protection rules may answer economic rationality demands, they
nonetheless contradict demands of the health system.'25 Resolution
2001/33 of the UN Human Rights Commission foresees such a conflict
solution. Measures such as the Brazilian AIDS program must thus be
exempted from economic logic to the degree that the normal standard for
patent protection is not to be applied in such cases. The critical conflicts
issue would thus be one of identifying collisions between the norms of
economic rationality and norms formed within the context of the protection of health.'27 In this concrete case, the matter is one of the evolution
of abstract and general incompatibility norms within the context of the
economic and health sectors and the priming of WTO law, as well as UN
law (seen as part of a transnational patents law), to deal with destructive
conflicts between incompatible rationalities.
C. From a Common lus Cogens to Regime Specific Ordres Publics
If one takes the realistic stance that there is no final hierarchical decisional instance within regime conflicts law, the question remains
whether or not common legal principles can be assumed within the heterarchical order of diverse autonomous regimes. The existence of ius
cogens within trans-national law is not merely a problem for political
regulatory regimes established by international treaties; instead, it poses
particularly acute problems for autonomous private governance regimes,
for the lex mercatoria or the lex digitalis, for example. Here we face a
seemingly insoluble dilemma: if the private governance regimes educe
from contractual relations between private global players, where is the
legal source of a mandatory law which would need to be created and enforced against the wishes of the parties to the contract? Accordingly, the
mere existence of mandatory law within private governance regimes has
124.
E.S.C. Res. 2001/33, U.N. ESCOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 171, U.N. Doc.
E/2001/23 (2001).
125.
For the concept of global societal law used here, see Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralismin the World Society, supra note 20; Fischer-Lescano, Die Emergenz
der Globalverfassung,supra note 20, at 750.
126 On the implications of the human rights covenants, see Alicia Ely Yamin, Not Just a Tragedy: Access To Medications as a Right Under International Law, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 101

(2003).
127.
Gunther Teubner, Ein Fall von struktureller Korruption? Die Familienbiirgschaftin
der Kollision unvertrdglicher Handlungslogiken, in KRITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT FUR
GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 388 (2000); see also Andreas Fischer-Lescano,
Odious Debts und das Weltrecht, 36 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 225 (2003).
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been doubted. It is important here to avoid two extreme positions. One
the one hand, binding norms do not possess a natural law like a priori
validity; accordingly the non-dispositive cannot simply be created following the logic of a higher ius cogens in the sense of Article 53 Vienna
Convention,'28 or of the UN constitution in its guise as a global constitution that reaches into all societal regime spheres by means of Article 103
of the UN Charter.2 9 On the other hand, however, an interpretation
founded in the potential "Hijacking" and "Hayeking"'"3 of human and
environmental rights by a regime with a highly particularist agenda,
which has haunted the debate on the constitutionalization of the WTO, is
also inadequate. Neither interpretation has fully plumbed the depths of
the problem of ius cogens posed by a heterarchical order.
A hierarchical elevation and subordination of legal orders is an equal
anathema to a polycentric global law as is the assumption that an emergent functional regime is an autarkical system operating within a global
societal vacuum. Beyond the alternative of either central coordination or
autarky of closed regimes, we are left with a network logic. It is characterized by combining two conflicting demands with one another. On the
one hand one finds in networks the autonomous and decentralized reflections of networks nodes which seek compatibility with their human and
natural environments. On the other, in networks linkages exist between
these decentralized reflections in the sense that nodes observe each other
closely. Thus, in spite of their autonomy, regimes can build on the assumption of common reference points, which is of course nothing but an
operative fiction. Building on this fiction, each of them can subordinate
themselves to a, necessarily abstract, seemingly common philosophical
horizon, to which they orient their own rule-making. This horizon of
non-dispositives possesses no common founding text; a common grammar has not been found. The only clear fact is that Article 53 Vienna
Convention cannot give clear expression to the unitas multiplex of
autonomous regimes since its provisions and legal consequences are
even subject to debate within the international law regime itself.'3' Even
more significantly, Article 53 has its place within international public
law and international politics; a semantic that would be without function
128.

Christian Tomuschat, InternationalLaw as the Constitution of Mankind, in INTER37 (U.N. ed., 1997).
129.
Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charteras Constitution of the International
Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529 (1998).
130.
Both formulations used by Phillip Alston in the Alston/Petersmann controversy, see
Alston, supra note 105.
131.
On the conflict on narrow and wide, and meaningful and less meaningful,
interpretation, see ANDREAS L. PAULUS, DIE INTERNATIONALE GEMEINSCHAFT IM
NATIONAL LAW ON THE EVE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

VOLKERRECHT: EINE UNTERSUCHUNG ZUR ENTWICKLUNG DES VOLKERRECHTS IM ZEITALTER
DER GLOBALISIERUNG

352-58 (2001).
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in other societal contexts in which proffered formulations, such as "in' "mandatory rules,"'33 and "ordrepublic transternational ordre public,"'
'3
national,' " are in circulation.
These concepts represent the legal expression of the common good
in highly diverse social contexts. Clearly, while a global ius non dispositium has no common written philosophical horizon, the unity of the
diverse concepts derives from the paradoxical situation that the linguistic
diversity of the global Esperanto of non-dispositive law does make subordination to the fiction of a common validity core possible, in a process
that the French philosophers, Deleuze and Gattari, might have characterized as being "rhizomorphic" in nature.'35 Nurturing different common
good formulas within different regime contexts certainly creates a problem. But the problem is not one of harmonizing these reference points,
but is instead one of prompting regime-internal self organization so the
different regimes can establish their own grammars for their version of a
global ius non dispositivum. A large variety of processes assume the
prompting role: the scandalizing of sectors of public opinion; 3 6 pressure
from international politics; 37 and co-operation between autonomous regimes."'
Third Example: Lex Constructionis
The lex constructionis and its standard contracts on trans-national
construction projects is dominated by a small number of well organized
private associations: the International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC), the International European Construction Federation
(FIEC), the British Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE), the Engineering
Advancement Association of Japan (ENAA), the American Institute of
Walter Kahn,
132.
Ordnung, in BERICHTE

Menschenrechtsvertrdge als Gewdihrleistung einer objektiven
DER

DEUTSCHEN

GESELLSCHAFT

FUR VOLKERRECHT:

AKTUELLE

(1994).
Nathalie Voser, Mandatory Rules of Law as a Limitation on the Law Applicable in

PROBLEME DES MENSCHENRECHTSSCHUTZES 9

133.

InternationalCommercialArbitration,7 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 319 (1996).
134.

HORACIO

A.

GRIGERA

NAON,

CHOICE-OF-LAW PROBLEMS

IN

INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 65 (1992).
TAUSEND PLATEAUS 36 (1992); GILLES
(1977).
136.
BRUNKHORST, supra note 59, at 212.
137.
See especially UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterpriseswith Regard to Human Rights, Sub-Committee for the Promotion and the Protection of Human Rights, 22d Sess., Meeting 55, U.N. Doc.
EICN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003).
See UN Global Compact, at www.unglobalcompact.org; on a preliminary stocktak138.
ing, see Lothar Rieth, Deutsche Unternehmen, soziale Verantwortung und der Global
Compact, at http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/gk.globale-herausforderungen/papers/rieth/052003_
LotharRiethSVDtUntLGC.pdf (2003).

135.

DELEUZE

&

F9LIX GUATTARI,

GILLES

DELEUZE

& FfLIX

GUATTARI, RHIZOM
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Architects (AIA). In addition, the World Bank, UNCITRAL,
UNIDROIT and certain international law firms also contribute to developing legal norms of the lex constructionis. Article 4.18 of the FIDC
Model Contract, which is fundamentally the same as Construction, Installation and EPC Model Contracts, furnishes us with the typical
formula deployed by these contracts-if the issue is considered at
all 140 -to give recognition of private construction contracts to environmental issues:
The Contractor shall take all reasonable steps to protect the environment (both on and off the Site) and to limit damage and
nuisance to people and property resulting from pollution, noise
and other results of his operations. The Contractor shall ensure
that emissions, surface discharges and effluent from the Contractor's activities shall not exceed the values indicated in the
Employer's Requirements, and
shall not exceed the values pre14 1
scribed by applicable Laws.
A fleeting glance suffices to show that the contractual agreement aims to
externalize the environmental costs of the entire project and that contractual duties relate only to the concrete measures that the contractual
parties should take to "limit" their own emissions. In general, such contracts do not elaborate human rights or general duties to the
environment. Oren Perez notes:
The response of the lex constructionis to the constructionenvironmental dilemma is, then, based primarily on a strategy of
deference, which seeks to externalize the responsibility for regulating the environmental aspects of the construction activity to
the 'extra-contractual' realm of the law of the host-state. This is
achieved through the employment of 'compliance' provisions,
which appear in most of the standard forms. [ ... I The notion of
'efficient risk-allocation' further illustrates how this logic of externalization operates. In order to maximize its economic value
the contract is expected to provide the parties with an efficient
risk-allocation scheme. This should be achieved by 42allocating
particular risks to the party best able to manage them.'

139.
EPC stands for "engineering, procurement and construction."
140.
The ENAA's Model Form and the Institution of Civil Engineers New Engineering
Contract [hereinafter NEC] do not even include such a limited provision.
141.
FIDC MODEL CONTRACT art 4.18.
142.
OREN PEREZ, ECOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: RETHINKING THE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT CONFLICT (forthcoming 2004) (especially the
details on contractual techniques within the lex constructionis).
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Amongst the large number of legal questions that this example gives
rise to, the following concentrates upon the global ius non dispositivum.
Although the notable case of Furundzija4 1 saw the ICTY extend the jurisdictional reach of the ius cogens principle to the degree that national
law contradicting Article 53 Vienna Convention would be invalid-a
conclusion that would also seem to suggest itself in relation to the UN1'
and to the WTO14 5-the operational capacities of the principle would
surely be overtaxed were it also to be afforded direct effect within private regimes such as the lex mercatoria,lex digitalis or the lex sportiva.
By the same token, the potential for the substantive extension within
international law-making processes of the legal goods protected by Article 53 Vienna Convention is also limited. Only segments of the
International Bill of Rights have been afforded the international legal
quality of the ius cogens, while a further clarification of Article 30 Vienna Convention within inter-regime processes is hardly to be reckoned
with.146 The establishment of hierarchies within global law is clearly regime dependent147 and, as the ICTY has made clear for itself and thus

143.
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, 28 I.L.M. 317, 349 para. 155 (1999) (decided Dec. 10, 1998):
The fact that torture is prohibited by a peremptory norm of international law has
other effects at the inter-state and individual levels. At the inter-state level, it serves
to internationally de-legitimise any legislative, administrative or judicial act authorising torture. It would be senseless to argue, on the one hand, that on account of the
jus cogens value of the prohibition against torture, treaties or customary rules providing for torture would be null and void ab initio, and then be unmindful of a State
say, taking national measures authorising or condoning torture or absolving its perpetrators through an amnesty law. If such a situation were to arise, the national
measures, violating the general principle and any relevant treaty provision, would
produce the legal effects discussed above and in addition would not be accorded international legal recognition.
Id.
144.
See, e.g., Matthias Herdegen, The "Constitutionalization" of the UN Security System, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 135, 156 (1994); Craig Scott et al., A Memorial for Bosnia:
Framework of Legal Arguments Concerning the Lawfulness of the Maintenance of the United
Nations Security Council's Arms Embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1, 59 (1994).
145.
See Pauwelyn, supra note 54, at 565.
146.
IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 94-96 (2d ed.
1994); on the WTO, see Bockenforde, supra note 54; on the issue within the context of the
Hague Convention, see Andrea Schulz, The Relationship between the Judgments Project and
other InternationalInstruments, Hague Conference On Private International Law, Preliminary
Document No. 24 (2003), at www.hcch.net/doc/jdgm-pd24e.pdf.
147.
Matthias Ruffert, Zustandigkeitsgrenzen internationaler Organisationen im
institutionellen Rahmen der internationalen Gemeinschaft, 38 ARCHLY DES VOLKERRECHTS
129, 164 (2000); Laurence Heifer, ConstitutionalAnologies in the InternationalLegal System,
37 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 193 (2004).
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also for others: "In International Law,
every tribunal is a self-contained
48
system (unless otherwise provided)."'
Rather than engage in a wholly unrealistic attempt to create a hierarchy within the fragmentation of global law, efforts should thus instead be
focused on the intra-regime responsiveness to the immediate human and
natural environment; that is, functional regimes must each evolve their
own ius non dispositivum. In this respect, we should not forget that the
UN regime has, to date, had much difficulty establishing its own ius cogens 49 Legal control of Security Council resolutions by the ICJ, the
'principle judicial organ' of the UN, is very limited. 50 The dysfunctional
separation of powers within the UN disadvantages UN self-organization,
forms a barrier to the development of an autonomous ius non dispositivum, and in part also contributes to a double "is-should" false
conclusion, whereby the room for manoeuvre afforded the Security
Council under Article 39 of the UN Charter is such that its control seems
to follow "through public opinion, but not through law."'' This position,
however, both underestimates the legal dimension of scandalizing public
opinion, ' and does not recognize the mutual dependency between the
regime and its environment; an environment whose normative
148.
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 35 I.L.M. 32, 39 para. 11 (1996) (decided Oct. 2, 1995).
149.
Most recently, see Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya vs. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J.
114-217; Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), 1993
I.C.J. 3-30.
150.
On the lacking "Marbury moment" within the UN regime, see Geoffrey Watson,
Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 45 (1993);
Thomas Franck, The "Power of Appreciation": Who is the ultimate Guardianof UN Legality?,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 519, 638 (1992); but see Prosecuter v. Dusko Tadic, supra note 143, at 4142, paras. 26-28:
These arguments [of the Security Council concerning the establishment of the
ICTY, the authors] raise a series of constitutional issues which all turn on the limits
of the power of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations and determining what action or measures can be taken under this Chapter,
particularly the establishment of an international criminal tribunal ... It is clear
from this text [Art. 39 of the Charter, the authors] that the Security Council plays a
pivotal role and exercises a very wide discretion under this Article. But this does not
mean that its powers are unlimited... The Security Council is thus subjected to certain constitutional limitations, however broad its powers under the constitution may
be.
Id.
151.

BERND

MARTENCZUK,
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275 (1996).
152.
Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, supra note 20;
Fischer-Lescano, Die Emergenz der Globalverfassung,supra note 20, at 750-53.
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expectations have an impact "if the special regime fails to function properly."'53 Absent both an autonomous ius non dispositivum and a
functioning, regime-internal, structural link between law and politics,
analysis must proceed from an assumption of the indirect effect of the
ius cogens of Article 53 Vienna Convention within the UN regime.'54 In
the words of Justice Lauterpacht:
The concept of jus cogens operates as a concept superior to both
customary international law and treaty. The relief which Article
103 of the Charter may give the Security Council in case of conflict between one of its decisions and an operative treaty
obligation cannot-as a matter of simple hierarchy of normsextend to a conflict between a Security Council resolution and
jus cogens. Indeed, one only has to state the opposite proposition
thus-that a Security Council resolution may even require participation in genocide-for its unacceptability to be apparent. '
By contrast, economic, scientific, technological, health-based and religious regimes need each establish their own reference points for nondispositive law. This can also be observed in the lex mercatoria and the
lex constructionis. Quite independent from the choice of laws made by
individual contracts within the lex constructionis, and all "national interests"-which representatives of the so-called special connection theory
would like to see taken into account even outside the contractual structure' 56--notwithstanding, the emergence of a lex mercatoriaspecific erga
omnes law can be observed that no longer bases itself within national
public policy. We could come to the conclusion that arbitration instances
must move beyond concrete contractual terms in order to take environmental consequences and human rights complications into account as
part of a specific ius non dispositivum; 57 equally, courts of arbitration
must apply their own ordrepublic:
It is generally recognized that the arbitrator can, in the name of
'truly international public policy,' refuse to give effect to certain
agreements of the parties. Likewise, if the object of a law is to
153.
Koskenniemi Outline, supra note 8, at 10; MARSCHIK, supra note 116, at 162-63.
154.
Reaching the same conclusion, see Herdegen, supra note 144, at 156; Scott et al.,
supra note 144, at 58-59; Watson, supra note 150.
155.
Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro), 1993 I.C.J. 4 (April 8)
(Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).
156.
Voser, supra note 133, at 323-25.
157.
Pierre Mayer, Mandatory Rules of Law in InternationalArbitration, 2 ARB. INT'L
274-87 (1986); ANDREAS BUCHER & PIERRE-YVEs TSCHANZ, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
IN SWITZERLAND 102-05 (1989).
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guarantee the respect of principles the arbitral tribunal considers
as forming a part of transnational or 'truly' international public
policy, it must find that such law prevails over the will of the
parties. Because of the transnational character of these norms, a
connection between the state that enacted the mandatory rules
and the dispute is not necessary.158
At the same time, if arbitration courts fail to take into account ius
cogens, it may well be that national courts will not enforce their decision. 5 9 Even more significant than these external pressures is the regimeinternal juridification of the duty of courts of arbitration to take binding
laws into account." The potential of this liability of arbiters for the generation of a ius non dispositivum has barely been explored within the lex
mercatoria. Accordingly, it is very possible to imagine of a situation
whereby a failure on the part of courts of arbitration to take note of the
norms of the ius non dispositivum could result in third parties raising
liability claims, modeled in line with national prototypes, against arbiters.
D. From Stare Decisis to Default Deference
By contrast to the binding nature of the judgments of superior
courts, it belongs to the logic of networks that autonomous regimes enter
into relations of mutual observation. 6' Legal certainty within this polycentric legal system cannot be furnished by a hierarchically superior
decisional instance placed at the center of the law. Rather, what can be
realistically expected is uncertainty absorption in a process of iterative
158.
Voser, supra note 133, at 349-50.
159.
See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 42 art. V(1)(c); see also Eric A. Posner,
Arbitrationand Harmonization of InternationalCommercial Law: A Defense of Mitsubishi, 39
VA. J. INT'L L. 647, 651 (1999).
160.
See Andrew T. Guzman, ArbitratorLiability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE L. J. 1279, 1316-17 (2000):
The use of arbitration can be reconciled with the presence of mandatory rules by
recognizing that the arbitrator and the parties to the transaction are bound by contract and by imposing on the arbitrator a duty to apply mandatory laws in the
performance of his contractual obligations. Under arbitrator liability, the arbitrator
is required to carry out his responsibilities subject to the requirement that he respect
mandatory rules, just as he must carry them out subject to a duty of good faith. Like
the duty of good faith, the duty to enforce mandatory rules cannot be waived by

contract.
Id.
161.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191
(2003); William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International
Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002).
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connection of legal decision to legal decision that recalls the strict precedent tradition, but that also departs from it in various significant ways.
Fourth Example: Desaparici6n
Around 30,000 people disappeared (the desaparici6n) during the
Argentinean military dictatorship of the years 1976-1983. During its
transition back to democracy, Argentina first applied amnesty laws freeing wrongdoers from prosecution. In 2003, however, the Argentinian
National Congress declared
both amnesty laws passed by the Alfonsin
62
regime to be invalid.
What is of interest here is the manner in which the global legal system has dealt with the Argentinian desaparici6n. The case raises
important issues, implicating a whole host of non-territorial courts, although many would prefer to see these Gordian knots severed by the
sword of politics.163 The legal challenges can be distilled down to a ques-

tion of which crimes can be judged under which jurisdictional rules in
which systems and under which treatment of the immunity question. The
entire discussion has been dealt with elsewhere.' 64 The case of the disappeared, however, is also an instructive example of how contingent issues
can be transformed into international criminal law under conditions of
iteration and the absorption of uncertainty.
The first case that explicitly dedicated itself to the crime of disappearance, 6 1 was the decision of the United States District Court, in the
162.
Law No. 23.492, Dec. 24, 1986, 1986-B L.A. 100 (Argentina); Law No. 23.521,
June 8, 1987, 1987-A L.A. 260 (Argentina). See also Boletfn Oficial of the 3rd September
2003.
163.
Arguing against universal jurisdiction, see Henry Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, 80 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 86 (2001); arguing against immunity exceptions, see
Paul W. Kahn, On Pinochet, 24 BOSTON REVIEW 1 (1999), available at http://bostonreview.
net/BR24. I/kahn.html.

164.

ANDREAS

FISCHER-LESCANO,

GLOBALVERFASSUNG:

DIE GELTUNGSBEGRUNDUNG

supra note 20. For an instructive
summary of the doctrinal questions of desaparici6n and desiderata from a lex ferenda perspective, see Manfred Nowak, Report for the Human Rights Commission, U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/2002/7 i, at 8, 25 (Jan. 8, 2002).
165.
The decision of the Nuremberg Tribunal was not explicitly concerned with disappearances, but saw Hitler's Night and Fog-Order ("Nacht- und Nebel-Erlass"), see "Night and
Fog" Decree, Doc. 090-L, 37 IMT-Nuremberg 570-75 (1945), as demonstrating the characteristics of systematic ill-treatment, brutality in the sense of art. 6(b) of the Nuremberg Statute
and art. 46 of the Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land. See Proceedings of
the 218th Day, 1 IMT 485-530, (Oct. 1, 1946). See also Annex XXII, Views of the Human
Rights Committee under Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights concerning Communication No. 107/1981, U.N. Doc.
A/38/40/Supp.40, at 216 (1983) (submitted by: Maria del Carmen Almeida de Quinteros, on
behalf of her daughter, Elena Quinteros Almeida, and on her own behalf); Maria del Carmen
Almeida de Quinteros v. Uruguay, Communication No. 107/1981, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2,
at 11 (1990) [hereinafter Quinteros v. Uruguay].
DER MENSCHENRECHTE IM POSTMODERNEN IUs GENTIUM,
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case of Forti v. Suarez-Mason. The court first ascertained that no precedent existed for its decision:
However, plaintiffs do not cite the Court to any case finding that
causing the disappearance of an individual constitutes a violation of the law of nations. [... ] Unfortunately, the Court cannot
say, on the basis of the evidence submitted, that there yet exists
the requisite degree of international consensus which demonstrates a customary international norm."6
Nonetheless, the plaintiffs were not satisfied with this judgment and
a few months later the court dared to give a fresh judgment on the basis
of academic literature and political resolutions alone:
The legal scholars whose declarations have been submitted in
connection with this Motion are in agreement that there is universal consensus as to the two essential elements of a claim for
'disappearance'. .. Plaintiffs cite numerous international legal
authorities which support the assertion that
'disappearance' is a
67
universal wrong under the law of nations.
In the following time masses of judgments were handed down on the
crime of disappearance. This issue was dealt with for a variety of reasons
by very different regimes: national courts, the Inter-American Human
Rights Court, the European Court for Human Rights and the Human
Rights Commission for Bosnia-Herzegovina. 6 1 In addition to the emergence of a transnational criminal norm-indeed, even a ius cogens norm
in the sense of Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, on the
"disappeared" and the reception of these decisions by Argentinean

166.
Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1542-43 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
167.
Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 710 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
168.
See Veldsquez Rodrfguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., OAS/ser. C/no. 4, at para. 153
(1988); For later cases, see Godinez Cruz Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., OAS/ser. C/no. 5, at para.
161 (1989); Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., OAS/ser. C/no. 22, at
paras. 54, 62 (1995); Blake Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., OAS/ser. C/no. 36, at paras. 26-30
(1998); Villigran Morales et al. Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., OAS/cer. C/no. 63 (1999) (Cangado
Trinidade & Abreu-Burelli, JJ., concurring); Bdmaca Velisquez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
OAS/sec. C/no. 70, at § XVII (2000); Durand and Ugarte, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., OAS/ser. C/no.
68 (2000); Trujillo Oroza Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., OAS/ser. C/no. 64, at para. 41 (2000);
Kurt v. Turkey, 1998-HI Eur. Ct. H.R. (no. 74) 1152, at 1171 (1998); Kaya v. Turkey, 2000-I1
Eur. Ct. H.R. 149; Cicek v. Turkey, App. No. 25704/94, 934 Eur. Ct. H.R. 56 (2001); Cyprus
v. Turkey, App.
No.
25781/94,
Eur. Ct.
H.R.
(May
10,
2001),
at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm; Battista v. Colombia, U.N. CCPR, Hum Rts.
Comm'n, Comm. No. 563/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993; Palic v. Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, Case No. CH199/3196, Hum. Rts. Chamber for Bosnia
and Herzegovina (2001); Unkovic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Case No. CH/99/2150, Hum.
Rts. Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina (2001).
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judges' 69-the process proved remarkable for the manner in which
judges from very different regimes entered into mutual observation of
other regimes. The networking in this process is not always explicit ,70
169.
For more about this, see Pablo Parenti, Nuevas perspectivas en el tratamientopenal
de las violaciones de DDHH en Argentina entre 1976 y 1983, in ESTADO DE DERECHO Y DELINCUENCIA DE ESTADO EN AMtRICA LATINA

(Jorg Arnold et al. eds., forthcoming 2004).

170.
The first decisions mentioned in supra note 168 referred to political declarations
and conventions. See, e.g., Velisquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 168, at para. 151; Godfnez
Cruz Case, supra note 168, at para. 159. Later the courts used to practice a technique of mutual references. In Bdmaca VelAsquez Case, for example, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights quotes the European Court of Human Rights. Bimaca Velisquez Case, supra note 168,
at para. 162, which cites decisions from these European Court of Human Rights cases: Aksoy
v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553 (1997); Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 17 (1988); Kurt v. Turkey, supra note 168; Timurtas v. Turkey, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 6
(2000); (!akici v. Turkey, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 5 (1999); and the Human Rights Committee of the
CCPR: Quinteros v. Uruguay, supra note 165. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
quotes the European Court of Human Rights' Kurt decision, which refers to the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights and names the loci classici of the legal issues of "disappearance":
The United Nations Human Rights Committee, acting within the framework of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") has drawn up reports on a number of cases of forced disappearances: Quinteros v. Uruguay
(107/1981) Report of the Human Rights Committee, GAOR, 38th Session, Supp.
no. 40 (1983), Annex XXII, § 14; Mojica v. Dominican Republic, decision of
15 July 1994, Committee's views under Article 5 § 4 of the Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR concerning communication no. 449/1991: Human Rights Law Journal
("HRLJ") vol. 17 nos. 1-2, p.18; Bautista v. Colombia, decision of 27 October
1995, Committee's views under Article 5 § 4 of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR
concerning communication no. 563/1993: 17 HRLJ vol. 17 nos. 1-2, p. 19).
[...]
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights had considered the question of enforced disappearances in a number of cases under the provisions of the American
Convention on Human Rights and prior to the adoption of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons: Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras,
judgment of 29 July 1988 (Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (Ser. C) no. 4) (1988)); Godinez
Cruz v. Honduras, judgment of 20 January 1989 (Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (Ser. C) no. 5)
(1989)); and Cabellero-Delgado and Santana v. Colombia, judgment of 8 December
1995 (Inter-Am. Ct. H. R.).
Kurt v. Turkey, supra note 168, at 1171-72, paras. 65, 67.
Furthermore, the Human Rights Committee for Bosnia and Herzegovina refers in its decision of Unkovic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 168, paras. 91-99, to-among
others-the European Court of Human Rights (Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (1991); Kurt v. Turkey, supra note 168, (;akici v. Turkey, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep.
5 (1999); Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (May 10, 2001), at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm) and to the Committee of the CCPR (Quinteros v.
Uruguay, supra note 165).
The Argentine Federal Court refers in Sim6n, supra note 169, among other things to decisions in Spain (Sumario 19/97-L, Juzgado Central de Instrucci6n Nro. 5 de la Audiencia
Nacional de Madrid); the United States (citing among others the following cases, listed in the
order cited: Extradition of Carlos Guillermo Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Cal.
1988); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F
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but rather comprises an informal reference to a given processes of transformation, building upon the individual aspects dealt with in past cases.
Thus, for example, the ICJ decision in the arrest warrant case-a case
which saw the ICJ base itself upon national immunity rules for state
functionaries which distinguish between crimes committed in a private
or an official function-can only be understood against the backdrop of
Argentinean cases and the Pinochet case; it can only be explained where
the observer is aware that this differentiation owes to a normative concept that refuses to afford human rights crimes an official state character
and thus classifies them as private acts. The House of Lords in the Pinochet Case, in particular, transformed the question of "when exists a
ratione materiae exception to immunity for persons who, rationepersonae, are to be regarded as immune," into one of a public/private
differentiation' 7' and it was this differentiation with which the ICJ
worked,' even though in the concrete case before them-the case of an
official functionary carrying out his office-the court held the arrest warrant to be contrary to international law.

Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 E Supp. 707 (N. D. Cal. 1988);
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992); Comm. of U.S.
Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
736 F Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990)); citing also to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Prosecutor v Tadic, supra note 7); to Israel (Attorney General of Israel v.
Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18 (Isr. Dist. Ct.-Jerusalem 1961) (an unofficial translation of the District Court opinion prepared by the Israeli Government is also available at 56 Am. J. Int'l L.
805 (1962)); to the Netherlands (Public Prosecutor v. Menten, 75 I.L.R. 351, 362 (Neth. Sup.
Ct. 1981)); and by the Committee of the CCPR (Comments on Argentina, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.46 (1995).
171.
There are in total four decisions of global remedies in the Pinochet-case: (1) For
Divisional Court remedies, see In re Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, 38 I.L.M. 68 (1999) (Q.B.
Div'l Ct. 1998); Reg. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte,
[1998] 3 W.L.R. 1456 (H.L.) [hereinafter Pinochet 1]; Reg. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary
Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.2), [1990] 2 W.L.R. 272 (H.L.) [hereinafter Pinochet
2]; Reg. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, exparte Pinochet Ugarte, [1999] 2 W.L.R.
827 (H.L.) [hereinafter Pinochet 3]; see Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials be
Triedfor International Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EUR. J.
INT'L L.

853, 869 (2002) (pleading for a transformation of the private/official acts differentia-

tion).
172.
Thirdly, after a person ceases to hold the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, he
or she will no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded by international law in
other States. Provided that it has jurisdiction under international law, a court of one
State may try a former Minister for Foreign Affairs of another State in respect of
acts committed prior or subsequent to his or her period of office, as well as in respect of acts committed during that period of office in a private capacity.
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 61 (Feb. 14).
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Were the fragmentation discussion within international law to concentrate on potential hierarchical solutions it tended to miss the point.
Instead, it needs to re-focus on the issue of precedent. Is there a middle
way here between the Scylla of legal binding through strict precedent
and the Charybdis of a concept of precedent founded in simple persuasion or even the harmonization of methodological approaches?' In fact,
"default deference" presents one possibility; that is, the rebuttable presumption that the decisions of international regime courts do have the
character of precedent for one another. 4 There is a connection to the
issue of uncertainty absorption within networks and formal organizations; 75 that is, the acceptance of previous decisions with a continuing
potential for variation. The ICTY made clear in the Celebici Judgment
that:
the operation of the desiderata of consistency, stability, and predictability does not stop at the frontiers of the Tribunal. The
Appeals Chamber cannot behave as if the general state of the
law in the international
community whose interests it serves is
76
none of its concern.1

By the same token, however, the ICTY itself was correct, in the Tadic case, 7 7 to expand the ICJ "effective control test"'' 7 through a new
distinction and to declare the ICJ criteria to be non-applicable to the
concrete case, since it concerned organized military groups rather than
unorganized individuals, as had been the case in the Nicaraguajudgment. Equally, the judgment also cannot be termed provocative in terms
of its treatment of the legal question. The ICTY surely had good reason, 79 within the concrete context of individual responsibility in the
realm of humanitarian law, to afford a more extensive interpretation to a
restrictive reading of causality that is wholly appropriate for exceptions
given for the use of force within the context of Article 51 of the UN
173.
See, Jan Neumann, Die materielle und prozessuale Koordination volkerrechtlicher
Ordnungen: Die Problematik paralleler Streitbeilegungsverfahren am Beispiel des
Schwertfisch-Falls, 61 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VoLKERRECHT 529, 547 (2001).
174.
Martinez, supra note 33, at 487.
175.
NIKLAS LUHMANN, DIE POLITIK DER GESELLSCHAFT 189 (2000).
176.
Prosecuter v. Zejnil Delalic [hereinafter Celebici Case], International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-96-2 1-A, at paras. 26 (Feb. 20, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/cel-ii960321e.htm. This decision quotes the
separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen in the case Laurent Semanza v. Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-A, at para. 25 (May 31, 2000).
177.
Prosecuter v. Tadic, supra note 7, at paras. 115-45.
178.
Id. at para. 115.
179.
That is, good reason in the same manner that national jurisdictions give voice to
different causality concepts in civil and criminal law.
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Charter.'8 ° The prominence that a fragmentation discussion affords differences between the ICJ and ICTY is thus unjustifiable in substantive
terms,' 8' and, indeed, seems to be more concerned with the fact that
while the ICTY stated, "with respect" in its Tadic decision that, in view
of the concrete case matter, it "does not hold the Nicaragua test to be
persuasive,"'82 the Celebici decision saw it insist upon its status as an
"autonomous judicial body" without a "hierarchical relationship" to the
ICJ.'83 This, however, is neither a provocation, nor a judicial revolution,
but rather a form of judicial networking at the global level that is suited
to complexity.
IV. FROM LEGAL UNITY TO NORMATIVE REGIMES COMPATIBILITY
What impact does all this have upon a self-perception of law in view
of the fragmentation of transnational law into autonomous regimes? The
immediate consequence is that high expectations of our ability to deal
adequately with legal fragmentation must be curbed since its origins lie
not in law, but within its social contexts. Rather than secure the unity of
international law, future endeavors need to be restricted to achieve weak
compatibility between the fragments. In the place of an illusory integration of a differentiated global society, law can only, at the very best, offer
a kind of damage limitation. Legal instruments cannot overcome contradictions between different social rationalities. The best law can offer-to
use a variation upon an apt description of international law-is to act as
a "gentle civilizer of social systems.' ' 4 In the words of Ladeur, contradictions "cannot be avoided, rather a new form of self-observation and
self-description within the legal system must, in fact, take on the task of
maintaining compatibility and lines of communication between differing
legal arenas."' 85 A realistic option is that legal "formalization" might be
able to dampen the self-destructive tendencies apparent within rationality collisions. If all goes well, as our examples show, it might be possible
to translate a limited portion of these rationality conflicts into the quaestio iuris and thus offer one among several fora for peaceful settlement.
Even then, however, law does not act as a superior coordinating instance;
much would already have been achieved were it able to furnish forms of
180.
This was the same reason given for departure from the ICJ's effective control test in
the case of Prosecuter v. Kvocak, Case No. IT-98-30/1, T.Ch., (Dec. 5, 2000).
181.
Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 10, at 566.
182.
Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 7, at para. 15.
183.
Celebici Case, supra note 176, at paras. 24, 26.
184.
See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND
FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
185.
LADEUR, supra note

1870-1960 (2002).
58, at 159-60.
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legal guarantees for autonomy in the face of totalizing tendencies and
domination by one system. In the context of societal fragmentation, law
will be forced to limit itself to its classical role; to furnishing compensation for and curb damage to human and natural environments.

